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Standardizing the Principles of
International Election
Observation
ABSTRACT

On October 27,
2005, thirty-two international
nongovernmental organizations(INGOs) and intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs) signed the Declaration of Principles for
InternationalElection Observation, drafted with the assistance
of the United Nations. For nearly four decades before the
signing of the Declaration, international election observation
rapidly gained acceptance as a legitimate method of
guaranteeingfree and fair elections and thus promoting lasting
democratic institutions. Many INGOs and IGOs conducting
observation missions-including the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe, the Organization of American
States, the South African Development Community, and the
Carter Center-independently developed standards for their
observers to follow. As international election observation
became more prevalent and more organizations entered the fray,
however, independent standardscontributed to confusion. The
Declaration thus sought to standardize election observation
principles governing both international observation missions
and host nations. Despite this noble goal, the Declarationfalls
short of providing a truly uniform and specific set of regulations
that host nations, INGOs, or IGOs-if they so choose-can
simply adopt. In seeking to remedy the shortcomings of the
Declaration, this Note examines existing international
principles and representative national laws and offers, in
conclusion, a draft Annex to the Declaration that incorporates
the most useful and effective of these provisions.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The international community has long considered free and fair
elections a necessary element of fully-functioning democracies.' The
right of citizens to vote in such elections is an internationally
recognized basic human right. 2 For a variety of reasons, however,
many states have proved incapable of establishing systems that allow

1.
Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation, Oct. 27,
2005, at 1 [hereinafter Declaration], available at http://www.accessdemocracy.org/files/

1923_declaration_102705.pdf ("Genuine democratic elections are a requisite condition
for democratic governance.").

2.

Id.
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free and fair elections to take place.3 The reasons for these states'
inability to construct functional electoral systems range from the
existence of authoritarian regimes to the instability of governmental
transitions. Rather than identifying and addressing the reasons
certain states do not hold regular elections, several governments and
organizations have taken on the more useful task of establishing
norms and mechanisms designed to protect the integrity of the
elections that do take place.
One of these mechanisms is nonpartisan election observation. 4
Since the late 1980s, governments and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) alike have spearheaded efforts to establish
both domestic and international election observation bodies. 5 In this
time, over half of the world's elections have been observed by major
international organizations. 6 These groups have invested enormous
amounts of energy in both observing and reporting on the fairness,
accessibility, and overall outcomes of national elections.
Despite the increasing prevalence of election observation
organizations, 7 there have been few attempts 8 to articulate formal,
widely-accepted international legal principles to govern the various
A detailed international
components of election observation.
statement should address: (1) the determination of how and when
international election observers should be deployed; (2) the
accreditation of observers; and (3) the observers' rights, duties, and
obligations. Several states have determined that election observation
would benefit the administration of their elections and have written
or amended their electoral laws to include provisions governing

A 2008 index of democracy by The Economist identified fifty-one countries
3.
that function under an authoritarian regime without free and fair elections, including

Cuba and North Korea. The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index 2008,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 2008, at 7-8.
4.
See Declaration of Principles and Code of Conduct: A Q&A with Democracy
available at
2005),
Ph.D (Oct. 31,
David Carroll,
Director
Program
http://www.cartercenter.org/news/documents/doc2232.html [hereinafter Carroll Q&A]
(discussing the emergence and practice of election observation). For the purposes of
this Note, the terms "observation" and "monitoring"-as well as their derivativesshould be considered interchangeable and identical. They do not indicate different
practices.

5.

Judith Kelley, Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of

InternationalElection Monitoring, 62 INT'L ORG. 221, 222 (2008); see also Carroll Q&A,
supra note 4 (discussing the Carter Center's role in election observation since the
1980s).
Kelley, supra note 5, at 222.
6.
7.
See generally id. (describing the growth in the number of electoral
observation bodies since the late 1980s).
8.
Declaration, supra note 1; African Union, African Charter on Democracy,
Elections, and Governance arts. 18-22, Jan. 30, 2007, available at http://www.africaunion.org/root/AUIDocuments/Treaties/text/Charter%20on%20Democracy.pdf.
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international election observers.9 Globally, however, there has been
only one attempt to formulate similar principles.' 0 In October 2005,
the United Nations helped facilitate over two dozen supranational
organizations' joint endorsement of the UN Declaration of Principles
for International Election Observation (Declaration)."
The
Declaration defines the general principles that all international
election observers should follow,' 2 but there remains much room for
improvement. Above all, the Declaration lacks detail and offers
feeble platitudes, leaving the specifics of international election
observation governance up to individual nations, international
nongovernmental (INGOs), and intergovernmental organizations
(IGOs).' 3 For these reasons, an update to the Declaration is now
necessary.
This Note examines international election observation principles
and national electoral laws. The Note then presents a draft Annex to
the Declaration that draws on the most useful and effective aspects of
those provisions. Part II of this Note explores the history and
contributions of international election observation and the promotion
of democracy since the late 1980s. Part III outlines certain principles
governing well-known international election observation bodies and

9.
See infra Part IV (discussing national legal provisions recognizing
international elections).
10.
Declaration, supra note 1. This is not to say that other international
nongovernmental organizations have not undertaken efforts to formulate principles
and codes of conduct for international election observers; indeed, many have. E.g.,
ELECTORAL COMM'N'S FORUM OF SADC COUNTRIES & ELECTORAL INST. OF S. AF.,
PRINCIPLES FOR ELECTION MANAGEMENT, MONITORING & OBSERVATION IN THE SADC

REGION (2004), available at http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/africa/regionalresources-africalecfeisa-princip.pdf/view (promoting such principles for fourteen
African states). These organizations, however, tend to be regional and do not have the
same ability to get a large number of states and organizations to sign on to their
declarations that, for example, the United Nations has.
11.
Declaration, supra note 1.
12.
Id. para. 9 ("International election observation must be conducted with
respect for the sovereignty of the country holding elections and with respect for the
human rights of the people of the country.").
13.
See id. para. 20 ('The intergovernmental and nongovernmental
organizations endorsing this Declaration recognize that there are a variety of credible
methodologies for observing election processes and commit to sharing approaches and
harmonizing methodologies as appropriate."). INGOs and IGOs should be defined, as
they are not as well known as more common NGOs. INGOs are simply NGOs whose
goals and missions reach across international borders. Union of International
Associations, What is an International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO)?,
http://www.uia.be/node/163571 (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). Like NGOs, they are not
affiliated with any government but are privately funded and operated. Id. IGOs, unlike
NGOs and INGOs, are organizations formed as a result of official, formal cooperation
between state governments. Institute for Trade & Commercial Diplomacy, Glossary,
Trade-Related
Organizations,
http://www.itcdonline.com/introduction/glossary3_fk.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2010).
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reviews the UN Declaration of Principles for International Election
Observation. Part IV addresses Russia's and Azerbaijan's electoral
law provisions governing international election observation missions.
Drawing on these national laws and international principles, Part V
discusses the provisions necessary for a proposed Annex to the
Declaration that would standardize the practice of international
election observation. Finally, Appendix A offers a full draft of the
proposed Annex.
II. THE HISTORY AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
ELECTION OBSERVATION

Since the end of the Cold War, the prevalence of international
election observation has increased dramatically. 14 This expansion
reached its peak in the late 1980s and early 1990s.15 Scholars
continue to debate why many states have allowed international
organizations to observe internal elections, which have long been
considered the most important domestic expression of sovereignty. 16
Judith Kelley, a preeminent scholar in the field, proposes that
international election observation gained traction as a "mechanical
This
function related to increasing democratic transitions."17
argument contends that as more and more states transitioned to
democratic forms of government, demand for aid in administering
elections increased.' 8 This explanation, however, is insufficient on its
own. As Kelley observes, transitions to democratic governments were
more prevalent in the 1970s and early 1980s than in the late 1980s
and 1990s; thus, if transitions drove international election
observation, the number of observation missions should have begun
to increase in earnest in the late 1970s.19 But this was not the case. 20
Another potential explanation rests on the diffusion model,
which holds that election observation gained prevalence in Latin
However, this
America and then "emanated from there."2 '
explanation is also incomplete: INGOs have successfully conducted
election observation missions outside of Latin America since as early

14.
See generally Kelley, supra note 5 (describing the growth in the number of
electoral observation bodies since the late 1980s).
15.
Id. at 222.
See, e.g., id. (analyzing potential causes of the increase in election
16.
observation through the evolution of norms).
17.
Id. at 224.
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
See id. at 222-23 (providing statistical evidence that the expansion of
20.
election monitoring peaked in the late 1980s and early 1990s).
21.
Id. at 224.
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as 1980-before the majority of the Latin American observation
missions occurred.2 2
Some argue that the "global normative environment about
elections and human rights" simply shifted after the Cold War. 23 The
director of the Democracy Program at the Carter Center has
contended that "the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s triggered a
dramatic expansion in the number of election observations
missions." 24 One might thus conclude that the Cold War encouraged
countries to actually recognize the universal human right to vote that
was guaranteed by Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.2 5 While more inclusive than other rationales, this
explanation also has its shortcomings. As Kelley explains, "[t]he end
of the Cold War alone .. . cannot explain the attention to elections,
the framing of election monitoring as a human rights issue, or the
specific choice of election monitoring as a favored tool of democracy
promoters." 26
For the purposes of this Note, it is sufficient to conclude this
round of the debate by noting Kelley's ultimate hypothesis.
Recognizing the strengths of each explanation, Kelley adopts a broad
approach that centers on the evolution of norms and the timing of the
Cold War.2 7 She concludes that
election monitoring initially emerged due to an evolving set of norms
related to democracy, elections, and human rights. These norms
interacted with post-Cold War changes in the international
environment to create both a demand for and a supply of
monitoring....

Thus, . ..

international election monitoring . ..

become the norm for nonestablished
28
states.

democracies

has

and transition

Whatever the reasons for the drastic increase in the number of
international election observation missions, it is obvious that-at
least for the foreseeable future-these organizations are here to
stay.2 9 The goals of these organizations are generally uniform and

22.
Id.
23.
Id.
24.
Carroll Q&A, supra note 4.
25.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI),
art. 25, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217A (III), art. 21, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810
(Dec. 10, 1948).
Kelley, supranote 5, at 225.
26.
Id. at 225-26.
27.
28.
Id.
29.
Well-recognized monitoring organizations include: the Organization of
American States (OAS), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's
(OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the Carter
Center, and the National Democratic Institute (NDI). Kelley, supra note 5, at 222; see
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include (1) assisting member states in holding credible elections that
conform to accepted international standards, and (2) contributing to
the establishment of a lasting electoral program in the host nation30
that has the capacity to administer free and fair elections. 3 1
Equally important is the rationale behind the achievement of
these objectives: establishing democracy and protecting sovereignty
throughout the world. International organizations have widely
recognized that democratic elections are "an expression of
sovereignty, which belongs to the people of a country, the free
expression of whose will provides the basis for the authority and
legitimacy of government." 32 The hope is that once countries actually
hold free and fair democratic elections, they will then be able to
establish additional procedures and institutions integral to
functioning democracies. 3 3
These goals also help explain why the international community
has taken such a keen interest in ensuring free and fair domestic

also
The
Carter
Center,
The
Carter
Center
Democracy
Program,
http://www.cartercenter.org/peace/democracy/index.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2010)
("The Carter Center has been a pioneer of election observation, monitoring more than
70 elections in Africa, Latin America, and Asia since 1989 and forging many of the
techniques now common to the field."); NDI, Elections, http://www.ndi.org/
elections (last visited Mar. 29, 2010) ("The Institute's approach to election-related
programming seeks to maximize the opportunities presented by elections to help
advance democratic progress."); Organization of American States, Elections,
http://www.oas.org/en/topics/elections.asp
(last visited Mar. 29, 2010) ("The
independent, impartial observation of elections lends transparency and confidence to
the electoral process and is one of the basic tools the OAS has to help strengthen
democracy in the region."); OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights, About Election Observation, http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/17781.html
(last visited Mar. 29, 2010) ("The OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights has extensive experience in observing elections. In the last decade, it
has observed around 150 election processes, deploying thousands of experts and
observers from the entire OSCE region."). Although the United Nations itself does not
usually engage in election observation efforts, its Electoral Assistance Division and its
Development Program (UNDP) often assist regional organizations' observation
programs. Electoral Assistance Division, Department of Political Affairs, Overview
Information, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpalead/overview.html (last visited Mar. 29,
2010).
30.
For the purposes of this Note, the terms "host nation," "host country," or
"host state" are used interchangeably and refer to a country in which international
election observation has occurred, is occurring, or will occur.
31.
U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME [UNDP], DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL
AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED NATION SECRETARIAT AND THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT

PROGRAMME: NOTE OF GUIDANCE ON ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE para. 3 (2001), available
at http://www.undp.org/governance/docs/ElectionsGuides Note%20of%20guidance.pdf.
32.
Declaration, supra note 1, at 1.
33.
Id.; see also OSCE, ODIHR, ELECTION OBSERVATION: A DECADE OF
MONITORING ELECTIONS: THE PEOPLE AND THE PRACTICE 1 (2005) [hereinafter OSCE
MANUAL], available at http://www.osce.org/publications/odihr/2005/11/17148_478_en.pdf
("Election observation has thus emerged as a valuable tool to support and promote
democratic elections as an essential element of sustainable democratic governance.").
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elections. Because most nations desire to interact with democratic
governments, they encourage the realization of transparent elections
as a vital step towards achieving widespread democracy. 34
Furthermore, "[iinternational election observation expresses the
interest of the international community in the achievement of
democratic elections, as part of the democratic development,
including respect for human rights and the rule of law."3 5
Observation organizations have called monitoring "one of the most
transparent and methodical ways to promote and encourage
democracy and human rights."3 6
In ideal circumstances,
international election observation strives to expose irregularities in
and to provide recommendations for improving the overall electoral
process.3 7 The hope is that international election observation will
"promote public confidence,. .. promote electoral participation[,] and
mitigate the potential for election-related conflict," thus augmenting
the integrity of the scrutinized electoral process.38
While the number of election observation missions has increased
over the last twenty to thirty years, no detailed, uniform rubric of
rules-other than general principles-governing international
This void needs to be filled.
election observers exists. 39
Organizations engaging in international election monitoring have
realized that they must balance a respect for national sovereignty
and authority with election observers' need for unfettered access to
the election process. 40 The National Democratic Institute (NDI) has
most eloquently articulated this dilemma:
All activities by international actors concerned with promoting legal
frameworks for democratic elections and related democratic
development need to conform to ethical standards that respect
sovereignty, which belongs to and flows from the people of a country,
by: (1) basing activities on international law-particularly the
normative processes developing in international human rights law; (2)
understanding that activities must serve the interests of the people of
the country, rather than the interests of those who may be presently in
power, who may be seeking it or other private interests; (3) employing
best practices and lessons learned in offering knowledge, techniques
and advice so that domestic actors can make the best decisions; and (4)

Declaration, supranote 1, at 1.
34.
35.
Id.
36.
Christian Strohal, Forewardto OSCE MANUAL, supra note 33, at v, v.
37.
Declaration, supra note 1, at 2.
Id.
38.
39.
See Carroll Q&A, supra note 4 ("The proliferation of observer organizations
and election observation missions in the last decade led to varying methods and
different standards of professionalism.").
See id. ('The Declaration tries to reconcile the difficult tension between the
40.
imperative of respecting the sovereignty and authority of host governments and
election officials, versus observer organizations' need for adequate access to all key
phases of electoral processes in order to conduct their activities credibly.").

772

VANDERBIL T/OURAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 43:763

ensuring transparency in the activities so that citizens may have trust
and confidence that those receiving assistance are being empowered to
act in the public's interest[,] and those providing it are acting in
41
accordance with international principles.

When the rapid increase in the number of international election
observation missions first began, INGOs such as NDI, the Carter
Center, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) each addressed this balancing act by formulating their own
standards and practices. 4 2 But these independent approaches
naturally resulted in the creation of several distinct norms of
international election observation. David Carroll, Director of the
Carter Center's Democracy Program, noted that "[t]he proliferation of
observer organizations and election observation mission[s] in the last
decade has led to varying methods and different standards of
professionalism and to concerns that some organizations had conflicts
of interest or political agendas." 43
For international election observation missions to be successful,
these organizations needed to devise a common methodology.
Drawing on existing approaches, the UN assisted a group of INGOs
and IGOs conducting international election observation missions in
drafting what remains the most complete articulation of guidelines
designed to achieve a balance between international principles and
national sovereignty: the UN Declaration of Principles for
International Election Observation, approved by thirty-two
organizations in October of 2005.44

PROMOTING LEGAL
41.
PATRICK MERLOE, NAT'L DEMOCRATIC INST.,
FRAMEWORKS FOR DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS: AN NDI GUIDE FOR DEVELOPING ELECTION
LAWS AND LAW COMMENTARIES 7-8 (2008).
42.
See id. (quoting NDI's standards); infra text accompanying notes 48-49,
56-58, 62 (discussing ODIHR, OAS, and SADC standards).
43.
Carroll Q&A, supra note 4.
44.
See Declaration, supra note 1, at 1 ("[The Declaration] assesses election
processes in accordance with international principles . .. while recognizing that it is
the people of a country who ultimately determine credibility and legitimacy of an
election process."); Kofi Annan, Remarks at Ceremony of Endorsement for Principles of
International Election Observation (Oct. 27, 2005) (transcript available at
http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/nondatabase/annan's%20remarks%2010.27.05.
htm) (discussing how the Declaration assists observer missions in carrying out their
responsibilities so that they are "always making a positive contribution").
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III. REGIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION GUIDELINES AND
THE UN DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES FOR
INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION

A. FoundationalElection Observation Guidelines
Since 1990, several international and intergovernmental
organizations have independently developed election observation
guidelines, thus establishing a foundation upon which the UN
Declaration could be built. This subpart examines the most notable
of these efforts, which include: (1) the Copenhagen Document of 1990
and its related guidelines; (2) the Inter-American Democratic Charter
of the Organization of American States (2001); (3) Principles for
Election Management, Monitoring & Observation in the Southern
African Development Community Region (2003); and (4) the National
Democratic Institute's Guide for Developing Election Laws (2008).
In June 1990, the states participating in the Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) adopted the
Copenhagen Document. 4 5 Expressing the CSCE's belief that respect
for human rights would foster international justice and security,46 the
Copenhagen Document specifically identified the right to vote and
asserted that "the presence of observers, both foreign and domestic,
can enhance the electoral process for States in which elections are
taking place." 47 Nevertheless, although the Copenhagen Document

45.
Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Copenhagen Meeting,
Copenhagen, Den., June 5-29, 1990, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the

Conference on

the

Human Dimension of the

CSCE,

http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/1990/06/13992_en.pdf
Document]. The participating states were

pmbl.,

[hereinafter

available at
Copenhagen

Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the
USSR, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Yugoslavia.

Id.
46.

Id.

Id. para. 8. More specifically, the Document goes on to require that all
47.
signatories
invite observers from any other CSCE participating States and any appropriate
private institutions and organizations who may wish to do so to observe the
course of their national election proceedings, to the extent permitted by law.
They will also endeavor to facilitate similar access for election proceedings held
below the national level. Such observers will undertake not to interfere in the
electoral proceedings.

Id.
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generally sanctioned observers, the language indicated that the states
themselves would still have to develop the laws and regulations
governing observers. 4 8 The Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights (ODIHR) has since addressed the status, rights, and
obligations of observers more specifically, promulgating in 2001 the
Guidelines for Reviewing a Legal Framework for Elections.49 . The
Guidelines provide national parliaments and electoral officials with
advice on holding free and fair elections,5 0 clearly delineating what a
country's electoral observation laws should address: (1) the presence
of both domestic and foreign observers, media, political parties, and
candidates;5 1 (2) the accreditation and registration of observers;5 2 (3)
the rights of observers to be unlimited in their work; 5 3 (4) the process
through which observers may obtain relief if denied rights to
observe; 54 and (5) the rules regarding what observers may not do. 55
Overall, however, the Guidelines presented general principles as
opposed to specific regulations.
The Organization of American States' (OAS) support for election
observation missions reached a peak in the 1990s, and since 1999, the
OAS has observed several elections throughout Central America,
South America, and the Caribbean. 56 The OAS' Inter-American

48.
See supra note 47.
49.
OSCE, ODIHR, GUIDELINES FOR REVIEWING A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
ELECTIONS (2001) [hereinafter OSCE GUIDELINES], available at http://www.osce.org/
publications/odihr/2001/01/13588_128_en.pdf.
50.
Id. at 1
These guidelines are intended to set forth the basic components of a legal
framework governing elections, and the minimum standard relevant to each
component, that are necessary in order for a country's legal framework to
ensure democratic elections. They are further intended to provide the examiner
of the legal framework with an approach that will contribute to uniformity,
reliability, consistency, and accuracy in the review of election related text.
These guidelines will also provide guidance to national parliaments when they
are drafting or amending election related text.

Id.
51
Id. at 23.
52.
Id. at 24. The document addresses questions of what government
organization holds the authority to accredit the observers, what the requirements for
observer status are, and when observer status may be revoked. Id.
53.
Id. Such rights include those "to inspect documents, attend meetings,
monitor election activities at all levels at all times, including counting and tabulation,
and to obtain copies of protocols at all levels." Id.
Id.
54.
55.
Id. Restrictions include interference with voting, counting, and voters'
decision-making. Id.
56.
ORG. OF AM. STATES, A MANUAL FOR OAS ELECTORAL OBSERVATION
MISSIONS
5-6
(2007); see also Electoral Observation
Missions Reports,
http://www.oas.org/sap/english/txt-cooperacion-publicacionesmisiones.html
(last
visited Mar. 29, 2010) (providing reports from each mission).
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Democratic Charter governs election observation missions
undertaken by the OAS, directly addressing the responsibilities and
rights of both member states and election observation missions.57 It
recognizes that voting is an expression of sovereignty belonging to
each member state and, therefore, that "electoral observation
missions shall be carried out at the request of the member state
concerned."5 8 The Charter establishes both the post-invitation
obligations of member states, namely guaranteeing "conditions of
security, free access to information, and full cooperation with the
electoral observation mission,"59 and the duties of the OAS and the
goals of the election observation missions themselves. 60 Finally, the
Charter requires electoral observation missions to present detailed
reports of their findings to the Permanent Council and General
Secretariat of the OAS. 61
The fourteen states of the Southern African Development
Community (SADC), and their respective Electoral Management
Bodies (EMBs), have also developed standards addressing election
observation. 6 2 The SADC's recommendations address-among other
parts of the process-the obligations of the host states and their
EMBs, 63 the obligations of the observation missions, 64 general

arts.
23-25,
OAS
Doc.
Democratic
Charter,
57.
Inter-American
OEA/Ser.P/AG/Res.1 (Sept. 11, 2001), available at http://www.oas.org/charter/
docs/resolutionl-en..p4.htm.
Id. art. 24.
58.
59.
Id. These guarantees and conditions should be codified, according to the
Charter, in an agreement that specifies the reach of the mission. Id.
Id. The Charter notes broadly that the OAS must provide each mission
60.
with the resources necessary to allow the mission to conduct its work in an objective
and transparent manner. Id.
61.
Id.
62.
ELECTORAL COMM'N'S FORUM OF SADC COUNTRIES & ELECTORAL INST. OF
S. AF., supra note 10, at 1-2. Such standards are important, according to the SADC,
because they allow the Community to
evaluat[e] and assesso whether or not the electoral process in any given
country has been conducted in a free, fair, transparent and credible manner. In
addition, monitoring and observation can assist a country holding elections to
prevent, manage or transform election-related conflicts through impartial and
timely reporting as well as identifying strengths and possible weaknesses of the
election process as a whole.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 31-32. The recommendations first place several obligations on host
63.
states, including the duties to (1) grant freedom of movement and association to all
observation missions; (2) extend invitations to observer missions in a timely manner so
that they may prepare properly; (3) ensure an efficient accreditation process; (4)
provide the same protection of the laws to observers as to its own citizens; and (5)
develop a code of conduct for individual observers that does not interfere with the
observers' ability to execute their mission. Id.
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accreditation procedures, 65 the reporting responsibilities of the
observation missions, and the conduct expected of individual
observers. 66 The Principles for Election Management, Monitoring &
Observation in the SADC Region, more than any other document
before it, established specific rights and obligations of a broad range
of actors in the electoral process, including the observation missions
themselves. 6 7
Finally, in Promoting Legal Frameworks for Democratic
Elections, the National Democratic Institute recognized that many
countries and international organizations have entered into
agreements binding them to permit election observation 68 and thus
offered a checklist of several election observation-related questions
that must be addressed in the administration of free and fair
elections. 6 9
This checklist includes inquiries into countries'
recognition of election observers, the access they grant to observers,
and the restrictions they place on those observers.70 Assuming that

64.
Id. The document also places several responsibilities on the observation
missions: (1) adequate preparation for the mission; (2) admission of any conflicts of
interest; (3) possession of a general understanding of the SADC region and the country
hosting elections; (4) drafting of a check-list establishing the scope of the mission; and
(5) cooperation with local actors in the electoral process. Id.
65.
Id. The document requires observation missions to satisfy several
administrative procedures including gaining accreditation for their observers and
producing impartial and credible reports of their findings. Id. More specifically, the
recommendations state that any observer mission must be accredited by the EMB of
the country hosting the election before conducting its work. Id. at 31. The document
also strongly urges observer missions to "produce and distribute widely impartial,
credible, professionally written press releases and interim and final assessment
reports, which will help the EMB ... identify any constraints on or shortcomings of the
electoral process." Id. at 32.
66.
Id. at 32-33. Finally, the recommendations require individual election
observers to conduct themselves in a professional, impartial manner that respects
national laws and cultures. Id. In particular, observers should (1) follow the laws of the
country; (2) respect cultures and practices; (3) act impartially and without prejudice
toward any party or part of the electoral process; (4) refrain from appearing to support
a certain party; (5) contribute to the legitimization of and increased public confidence
in the electoral process; (6) help enhance the political and social values of the host
country; (7) report any irregularities of fraud in the election process; and (8) exercise
good personal judgment. Id.
67.
See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text (discussing the rights and
obligations created by the document).
68.
MERLOE, supra note 41, at 45.
69.
Id. at 53-88.
70.
Id. at 60-61. The checklist reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
52. Are domestic nonpartisan election monitors recognized by law, regulation
and/or any other means?
a. If so, are they provided access to all elements of the election
process ... ?
b. What is involved in the accreditation process?
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the questions reveal that countries guarantee broad access, efficient
accreditation procedures, and limited constraints, NDI concludes that
international observation missions will be better able to foster fair
and transparent elections.

B. The UN Declarationof Principlesfor International
Election Observation
The international community took an unprecedented step
forward with respect to election observation when the UN adopted
the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation.71
Then-Secretary General Kofi Annan hailed the document as a
"pioneering initiative that should strengthen the role of the
international community in supporting democratic elections around
the world."72 Secretary General Annan specifically emphasized the
importance of providing a universal compilation of guidelines for
international election observers, noting that despite the increasing
number of international election observation organizations, "there
has been no set of commonly held standards governing this important
work. Now [there is]-and we must make full use of them."73
Secretary General Annan was not alone in recognizing the
importance of uniformity in the field of international election
monitoring. David Carroll also stated that one of the most important
impacts of the Declaration would be to "ensure that election

c. Is accreditation required to be conducted in an effective and timely
manner?
d. Is accreditation provided to organizations, which then accredit
individuals under their mandate?
e. Is there a separate law on legal registration of nongovernmental
organizations?
f. If so, does it contain any unreasonable restrictions that would hinder
domestic election observation? (E.g., restrictions on receiving funding or
assistance from international organization?)
55. Are international observers granted access to the election process?
a. If so, what is the accreditation process?
b. What is the scope of their access?
56. Are any restrictions placed on . . . domestic election
organizations . . . and/or international election observers?

monitoring

a. If so, what are the restrictions and do they correspond to constitutional
regulations and international principles?
Id. at 61.
71.
72.
73.

Declaration, supra note 1.
Annan, supra note 44.
Id.
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observation is carried out with greater consistency and credibility,
thus promoting public and international confidence in election
processes."74 The preamble of the Declaration itself recognizes that
as international election observation has become a widely accepted
practice, the importance of providing accurate and credible
evaluations of electoral processes has exponentially increased.75
The content of the principles articulated in the Declaration and
adopted by the endorsing INGOs and IGOs are relevant to this Note.
A basic understanding of the standards that the twenty-four
numbered principles 76 espouse is critical to understanding the goals
and components of international election observation. The principles
are best understood when grouped into eight overarching themes: (1)
the significance of free elections to host countries; (2) the definition,
purposes, and objectives of international election observation; (3) the
efficiency of international election observation missions and their
respect for national law and sovereignty; (4) the actions required of
countries before international election monitors agree to deploy
missions; (5) the pre-mission and in-mission obligations of
international election monitoring organizations; (6) the reporting
standards applicable to international election observers; (7) the
general responsibilities intrinsic to the election monitoring practice;
and (8) the policies aimed at maintaining transparency and
furthering judicious election monitoring procedures worldwide. 77
The Declaration's list of principles first articulates the gravity of
democratic electoral processes to nations holding elections.7 8 It states
that elections are "an expression of sovereignty," and that all citizens
hold a basic human right to "participate in the government and public
affairs of his or her country[,J" which is manifested in the right to
vote.79
The drafters then provide a basic definition of international
election monitoring and 'address the objectives of observation.8 0 The
Declaration characterizes international election observation as a
systematic and comprehensive process that encompasses the preelection, election-day, and post-election periods. 8 ' Observers should
monitor elements of elections including voter registration, delineation
of election districts, and actual election-day voting. 82 Whenever

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Carroll Q&A, supra note 4.
Declaration, supranote 1, at 2.
Id. at 2-8.
See id. (explaining the principles in further detail.)
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 3.
Id.
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possible, international election observers should also provide
recommendations for improving the efficiency of the scrutinized
electoral process without interfering in the domestic administration
of that process. 8 3 The Declaration also highlights the objectives of
international election observation, emphasizing that missions are
conducted for the "benefit of the people of the country" and, therefore,
are to be concerned with process rather than with electoral results. 84
To guarantee this impartiality, the Declaration states that no one
with any political preferences should be allowed to observe and that
INGOs conducting observation missions must not accept funding
from the governments of countries under observation.8 5
The Declaration then requires that observers respect national
laws and sovereignty and suggests that they seek cooperation with
host countries. 86 It delineates an extensive list of responsibilities
that the host country should perform before any observation body
agrees to undertake a mission.8 7 These responsibilities include (1)
issuing an invitation or indicating its willingness to accept observers;
(2) guaranteeing observers access to all steps of the election process,
all individuals related to the electoral process, and all parts of the
country; (3) guaranteeing observation organizations the right to
choose its observers without interference by the host government; (4)
guaranteeing observers the right to accreditation and the right to
issue public statements of findings; and (5) guaranteeing observers
that the host government will not interfere in any aspect of the
process or seek reprisal.8 8
As to the standards expected of international election
observation organizations and their individual observers, the
Declaration states that organizations should make their presence
known not only to the nation's government but also to all political
parties or competitors involved in the election process.8 9 Observers
should then ensure that these political competitors have access to all
processes related to the election structure in the country-including

83.
Id. at 2.
Id.
84.
85.
Id. at 2-4.
86.
Id. at 4.
87.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. Invoking these preconditions, the Declaration notes that while an
88.
INGO's choice to observe an election should not be interpreted as an indication that the
election is necessarily credible, observers should nonetheless avoid situations where
their presence might imply that a clearly undemocratic election is legitimate. Id. at 4.
The Declaration, in fact, suggests that individual observation organizations may
request a memorandum of understanding or similar document from the host country to
ensure its cooperation with such principles. Id. at 5.
89.
Id. In fact, acceptance of observers by those parties may even be required.

Id.
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the observers' own practices.90 In so doing, observation missions
should establish lines of communication with all political factions and
use these contacts to gather information on the country's election
processes. 9 ' Once received, the mission should evaluate any such
information and determine its value to the mission's assessment of
the overall process. 92 Following elections, ihternational election
observers should report their findings to the proper authorities by
"issu[ing] timely, accurate[,] and impartial statements to the
public ... [in which they present] their findings, conclusions[,] and
any appropriate recommendation they determine could help improve
election related processes."9 3
The Declaration next underscores several broad obligations of
election observation missions stemming from international norms.9 4
It asserts that all signatories commit to abiding by some statement of
principles and complying with the Declaration's guidelines to the
greatest practicable extent.9 5 Signatory organizations also commit to
providing their observers with an explanation of national election
laws and information about standard methodologies and appropriate
conduct. 96
Finally, the Declaration recommends that all endorsing
organizations collaborate to carry out international election
observation missions efficiently, transparently, and with an eye
toward the future of election observation.9 7 It provides an avenue for
additional observation organizations to endorse the Declarationeither permanently or on an ad hoc basis-and it encourages further
internal action by the political bodies of endorsing organizations.9 8
Above all, however, the Declaration itself admits that, despite its own
adoption, there still exists a variety of valid election monitoring

90.

91.

Id.
Id. at 6.

92.
Id.
International
observation
missions
might
also
establish
communications with domestic monitoring organizations-depending on such
organizations' existence and credibility-in order to share important information on
the electoral process. Id.
93.
Id. at 3. The Declaration later notes that international missions should also
report on whether domestic election monitoring organizations "are able, on a
nondiscriminatory basis, to conduct their activities without undue restrictions or
interference." Id. at 6. Such reporting may also be accompanied by advocacy from the
international organizations on behalf of domestic groups or citizens wishing to engage
in observation. Id. Id. at 6-8.
94.
95.
Id.

96.

Id. at 7.

97.
98.

Id. at 4, 7.
Id. at 8.
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techniques that the international community should ultimately
harmonize.9 9

IV. NATIONAL LEGAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING
INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION

In recognition of the success international and domestic election
observation missions have had in ensuring free and fair elections and
fostering the growth of lasting democratic institutions, several
nations have adopted laws and regulations governing such missions
in order to protect the nation's sovereignty and establish the rights,
duties, and obligations of visiting observers. The reasons for the
adoption of these laws at the national level vary. Many national
governments undergoing transitions simply choose to write the
provisions into their new constitutions or election laws; others choose
to amend their constitutions or election laws to include the
stipulations.
Certain nations'
laws governing international election
observation missions are more representative than others. 0 0 This
Note focuses on the electoral laws of two countries: Russia and
Azerbaijan. These countries not only have laws on international
election observation that are illustrative of those found worldwide but
they also arepresent distinct types and sizes of democratic
governments.
A careful examination of these laws ultimately
provides important insight into what the most important tenets of
comprehensive international election observation regulations should
be.

A. Russia
The Russian law governing international election observation is
set out in the Russian Federation Federal Law on the Election of the
President of the Russian Federation (Russian Election Law).10

99.

Id. at 7.

100.
Professor Judith Kelley of Duke University has conducted extensive
research on a variety of national election laws. The Author contacted her for advice in
selecting countries with laws on international election observation that would be
representative of laws throughout the world and contain rich detail. She suggested a
wide variety of countries, and the ultimate decision to select Russia and Azerbaijan
was affected primarily by the ability to find readily available primary source materials
(namely election laws and principles).
101.
On the Election of the President of the Russian Federation, Federal Law
No. 19-FZ (2003), available at http://www.cikrf.ruleng/1awlFL-19-FZ.jsp. Originally
adopted and approved by Russia's legislature in December 2002, the law was amended
in July 2007. Id.
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Articles 23 and 24 of the law address the rights, duties, and
obligations of international election observers (as well as the Russian
Federation's duty toward them), but provisions related to observation
missions are embedded throughout the law.10 2 These various
provisions are better understood when divided into manageable
categories based on their objectives.
1.

Sources of Law on the Participation of International Election
Observers

The Russian Election Law identifies the sources of law governing
international election observers in a short but wide-reaching
provision. It states that the law on international election observation
"shall be established by the international treaties of the Russian
Federation, this Federal Law, [and] other federal laws." 0 3 Such
encompassing language leaves open the possibility of further
codification of the law-perhaps even through international
Nevertheless, the Russian Election Law
lawmaking processes.
already provides useful detail governing several elements of
international election observation.
2.

Invitation, Recognition, and Accreditation
Election Observers

of International

Article 24 of the Russian Election Law recognizes international
observers as legitimate elements in sovereign Russian elections, thus
making it arguably the most important article of the law.104 Article
24(2) states that the President, the Federation Council, the State
Duma, the Government of the Russian Federation (generally), or the
Central Election Commission (CEC) may extend invitations to
Any international election
international election observers.10 5
observation mission must receive an invitation before observers enter
the country, but any group granted such an invitation shall
automatically obtain accreditation. 106 Proof of accreditation shall
include an identification card granted upon reception of an
accreditation application, a copy of the observer's invitation, and
another identifying document.1 07 Election officials may revoke the

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See generally id. (constituting the main body of law governing elections).
Id. art. 11, § 2.
Id. art. 24.
Id. art. 24, § 2.
Id. art. 24, § 1.
Id. art. 24, § 3.
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accreditation of any observer who "violates the federal laws or the
universally accepted principles and norms of international law."1 08
3.

Observatory Rights of International Election Observers

Article 23(5) of the Russian Election Law recognizes first and
foremost that international observers "may be present at polling
stations from the time a precinct election commission begins its work
and until it is informed that the higher-level election commission has
adopted a protocol on vote-returns, and also during vote recount."1 09
More specifically, before regular voting begins, international
observers shall be invited to examine empty ballot boxes and ballot
boxes containing the ballots of early voters. 110
International
observers may then remain at polling locations during the voting, the
counting and bundling of votes, the counting of unused ballots, the
preparation of any protocols related to the returns and results, and
any recounts; they may also inspect the results of these various
processes and, where appropriate, affix their signatures as a sign of
approval. 111 The law also guarantees that international observers
may receive certified copies of any protocols. 12 These monitoring
rights also guarantee an international observer the ability to meet
with candidates and their agents, official representatives of political
parties, and groups of voters.1' 3
4.

Limitations Placed
Observers

on the Work of International

Election

Despite this broad guarantee of rights, the Russian Election Law
also places a variety of limitations on the rights of observers and
requires those observers to fulfill certain obligations. First, the law
allows observers to carry out their monitoring work only "from the
day on which they receives [sic] accreditation . .. [through] the day of
the official publication of the general results of the election. .. .."114
Second, the law requires that precinct voting commissions keep
records of the presence of any international observers, based on the
observers' presented credentials." 5 Third, observers may not work

108.
Id. art. 24,
109.
Id. art. 23,
110.
Id. art. 69,
111.
Id. art. 23,
art. 75, § 2.
Id. art. 73,
112.
113.
Id. art. 24,
114.
Id. art. 24,
115.
Id. art. 69,

§ 11.
§ 5.
§ 4.
§ 6; id. art. 69, § 14; id. art. 73, §§ 1, 3, 7, 22; id. art. 74, § 2; id.
§§ 23, 26; id. art. 74, §§ 8, 17; id. art. 75, §§ 7, 12, 16.
§ 9.
§ 5.
§ 14; see also id. art. 74, § 14.
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with anyone else, and only their official parent organizations or their
own resources may provide support for their work.1 16 Fourth,
invoking the importance of national sovereignty, the law broadly
proscribes international observers from abusing their position to
affect the outcome of the elections: "Foreign (international) observers
shall not take advantage of their status to carry on activities
unrelated to monitoring" during either the campaign period or the
preparation and execution of the election itself.117 Finally, with
regard to observers who disrespect the sovereignty of the Russian
Federation or violate the Russian Election Law, Russia may not only
expel them from their respective polling stations but also subject
them to any penalties that Russian law prescribes."18
5.

Reporting
Observers

Standards

Expected

of

International

Election

When voting concludes, international observers have the right to
publicly comment on the election process.11 9 This right extends from
the time at which the Russian government adopts "the legislation on
the election of the President of the Russian Federation" to "the
preparation and conduct of the election" itself.120 Observers may
offer these public comments through both press conferences and the
mass media. 12 1
6.

Actions Required of Russia with Respect to International
Election Observers

The Russian Election Law also places certain obligations upon
Russia as the host nation. The law recognizes all international
observers as being "under the patronage of the government of the
Russian Federation" and thus requires that all federal agents and
election officials "render the necessary assistance to [those] foreign

The list of non-voting members of the territorial election commission and the
list of other persons mentioned in Clause 5, Article 23 of this Federal Law, who
were present at the determination of vote returns and preparation of the
protocol, shall be kept by the secretary of the territorial election.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

art. 24,
art. 24,
art. 69,
art. 24,

§ 6.
§ 10.
§ 15.
§ 8.
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(international) observers." 122 This also means, of course, that
observers are subject to the laws of the Russian Federation. 123
B. Azerbaijan
In June 2008, Azerbaijan amended its election laws with the aid
of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), a nonprofit organization "providing need-based assistance for election
administration and sustainable democracy building."124 IFES has
been present in Azerbaijan for more than ten years, providing "a
range of election technical assistance to the country's legislators,
Central Election Commission and subordinate election commissions,
candidates, observers, and voters."' 2 5 Among other changes, the
amendments to Azerbaijan's election laws facilitated the development
of "handbooks and informational materials for international and local
observation groups."' 2 6
The Election Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan (Azerbaijani
Election Code or Election Code) establishes the official laws
governing international election observation missions.1 27
The
provisions therein are further clarified in a document entitled
Instruction on Rules for Activity of International (Foreign) Observers
in PresidentialElections of the Republic of Azerbaijan.128
Finally, it must be noted that Azerbaijan held municipal
elections on December 23, 2009,129

which were subject to the

international election observation laws discussed in this subpart.
Although the Central Election Commission (CEC) accredited over
49,300 international and domestic observers,13 0 only one
international mission-the Council of Europe-sent monitors.13 1
122.
Id. art. 24, §7.
123.
Id. art. 24, § 11.
124.
Dan Blessington, Preface to the English-Language Edition of ELECTION
CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, at ii (Int'l Found. for Electoral Sys. Trans.,
2008) (2008), available at http://www.cec.gov.az/en/cec/election-code-eng.pdf.
125.
Id.
Id.
126.
127.
Id. arts. 40-42, 44.
128.
CENT. ELECTION COMM'N OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, INSTRUCTION ON
RULES FOR ACTIVITY OF INTERNATIONAL (FOREIGN) OBSERVERS IN PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN (2008), approved by Decision 7/27-4 (July 18,

2008) available at http://www.cec.gov.az/en/7president2008/instruction/instruction7-274.htm [hereinafter Decision 7/27-4].

129.

M. Aliyev, Preparationfor Municipal Elections in Azerbaijan Completes:

CEC Head, TREND NEWS, Dec. 19, 2009, http://en.trend.az/news/politics/elections/
1603972.html.
130.
Id.

131.

Fraud, Violations Observed in Azerbaijani Local Elections, REUTERS, Dec.

23, 2009, http://www.rferl.org/content/FraudViolations ObservedInAzerbaijaniLocalElections/1912202.html.
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Although certain news reporters claimed to have heard reports of
improper voting practices like carousel voting (i.e., voting in more
than one precinct),13 2 the CEC reported receiving "no complaints
regarding the election process." 3 3 Additionally, APA, a news media
outlet based in Azerbaijan, filed detailed reports from each polling
station demonstrating that, except for one or two individualized
instances of potential fraud witnessed and noted by observers, the
elections ran smoothly.134 At the time of this writing, it does not
appear as though the Council of Europe has released a final report of
These observations confirm that
its observation findings.13 5
Azerbaijan's election codes represent an excellent example of laws
and regulations that work. The CEC accredited observation missions
without problems, the observers and news media were able to report
freely on the elections, the elections themselves went smoothly, and
the few instances of potential fraud were observed and reported. A
further examination of the elections laws is thus useful for drafting
the Annex.
1.

General Background Principles of Election Observation

The Azerbaijani Election Code expressly recognizes the goals and
principles underlying international election observation that are
discussed above.136 It emphasizes that election monitoring should be
conducted openly and without regard to the interests of individual
candidates or political parties.' 3 7 The Election Code also stresses the
importance of considering actual circumstances and facts when
conducting election observation and presenting the results of that
observation. 3 8

132.
133.

Id.
Id.

134.

No Serious Violation of Law Recorded in Local Elections in Azerbaijan,

AZERI-PRESS
AGENCY
(Baku,
Azer.),
Dec.
23,
2009,
http://en.apa.az/
news.php?id=112952.
135.
See Council of Europe, http://www.coe.int/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2010)
(providing no final report).
136.
See supra text accompanying notes 77-99.
137.
ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, supra note 124, art.
41.1.1, 41.1.3; see also Decision 7/27-4, supra note 128, pt. IV, §§ 4.1.1, 4.1.3 (stating
that the "election process should not be influenced for a candidate or political party"
and the "observation should be conducted openly").
138.
ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, supra note 124, art.
41.1.2, 41.1.4; see also Decision 7/27-4, supra note 128, pt. IV, §§ 4.1.2, 4.1.4 (providing
instruction on rules for activity of international foreign observers in Presidential
elections of the Republic of Azerbaijan).

2010/

2.

INTERNA TIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION

Invitation, Registration, and Accreditation
Election Observers

787

of International

The Azerbaijani Election Code requires that all international
election observers "be registered with the Central Election
Commission" according to invitation rules promulgated in subsequent
legislation.139 The Milli Majilis (Azerbaijan's legislature), executive
bodies, or the CEC may send invitations once the government makes
an official decision to hold elections;1 40 alternatively, the Election
Code allows "influential non-governmental organizations, working in
the field of protection of human and citizens' rights and
freedoms . . . [to] submit their proposals on inviting international

observers."141
International observers who accept invitations are required to
register.142 From the day elections are announced until ten days
prior to those elections, invited observers may submit applications to
the CEC.143 The Election Code requires applications to include the
applicant's "surname, forename, patronymic, place of residence, and
ID card series and number[,]"1 44 as well as two photos.145 Applicants
must indicate if they are planning to work on behalf of a candidate or
political party, or are representing an INGO.1 46 Accreditation of the
observer must take place within three days of the submission of an
application, and the election commission can only deny registration if
it cannot confirm the applicant's provided information.14 7 Upon
registration, observers shall receive an official badge-prepared
according to CEC rules-in the national language of Azerbaijan and

139.

ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, supra note 124, art. 44.1.

140.
Id. art. 44.2; see also Decision 7/27-4, supra note 128, pt. I, § 1.1 (discussing
the rules for inviting international observers).
141.
ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, supra note 124, art. 44.3;
see also Decision 7/27-4, supra note 128, pt. I, § 1.1 (discussing the rules for inviting
international observers).
142.
ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, supra note 124, art. 44.4.
143.
Id. art. 40.6; see also Decision 7/27-4, supra note 128 pt. II, § 2.1 (describing
the process for applying for international observer registration).
144.
ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, supra note 124, art. 40.6;
see also Decision 7/27-4, supra note 128, pt. II, § 2.1 (describing the process for applying
for international observer registration).
145.
ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, supranote 124, art. 40.6;
see also Decision 7/27-4, supra note 128, pt. II, § 2.1 (describing the process for applying
for international observer registration).
146.
ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, supranote 124, art. 40.6;
see also Decision 7/27-4, supra note 128, pt. II, § 2.1 (describing the process for applying
for international observer registration).
147.
ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, supra note 124, art. 40.6;
see also Decision 7/27-4, supra note 128, pt. II, § 2.2 (discussing consideration and
rejection of applications).
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in one foreign language (likely that of the observer).14 8 Only this
badge-which must include the observer's name, country of origin,
address, assigned election commission(s), candidate, political party,
or INGO represented (if necessary) 14 9-and an additional form of
identification 1 50 will allow international observers to conduct election
observation. 15 1 Applicants denied accreditation may appeal to the
Court of Appeal. 152 Finally, the Election Code provides for the
rescission of an observer's registration if that observer fails to abide
15 3
by established national laws or international legal norms.
3.

Observatory Rights of International Election Observers

Both the Election Code and CEC regulations guarantee that
international observers "may observe the implementation of election
activities, the determining of voting results and election (referendum)
returns, the completion of protocols of voting results and election
(referendum) returns (overall returns) and the counting and
recounting of votes in all election commissions." 154 Clarifying these
basic pronouncements, the Election Code goes on to guarantee
international observers the rights to (1) study voter rolls; (2) be in the
voting room of any precinct at any time on election day; (3) observe
the distribution of ballots to voters; (4) observe the tallying of total
voters; (5) order that observation results be included in final protocols
of the CEC; (6) observe the counting of the votes and check the
validity of votes; (7) view the protocol and other election day
documents; (8) provide the person in charge at the precinct with
constructive comments; (9) obtain a copy of all protocols and
documents issued by the CEC; (10) observe any recounts; and (11)
observe the transfer of all documents from local election commissions
to the CEC.155 The CEC regulations reiterate these rights and,

148.
ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, supra note 124, art. 40.6;
see also Decision 7/27-4, supra note 128, pt. II, § 2.3 (describing the documentation
issued for approved applications).
ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, supra note 124, art.
149.
40.16.
Id.
150.
151.
Id. art. 44.4; see also Decision 7/27-4, supra note 128, pt. II, § 2.3
(describing the documentation issued for approved applications).
152.
ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, supranote 124, art. 40.6;
see also id. art. 40.7 (noting that virtually identical rules apply for those candidates
applying to regional election commissions, except that registration decisions must be
completed within two days and appeals are made to the CEC rather than the Court of
Appeals).
Id. art. 44.11.
153.
Id. art. 40.12.
154.
Id. art. 42.2; see also Decision 7/27-4, supra note 128, pt. V, § 5.1
155.
(discussing the rights and duties of international observers).
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additionally, guarantee that observers may monitor voter sign-in;
partake in parallel, unofficial vote counting; and, in furtherance of
these duties, meet with voters, candidates, commissions, political
party representatives, and other government or campaign agents. 15 6
4.

Limitations Placed on the Work of International
Observers

Election

Invoking the importance of national sovereignty, the Election
Code places very specific limitations on observers' rights and draws a
clear line between what observers may and may not do. The broadest
limitation placed on observers is the time during which they may
conduct their work. Article 41(3) of the Election Code allows
observation missions to operate only "from the date the elections
(referendum) are announced [to] the day when all disputes regarding
elections (referendum) are heard by the relevant courts, and returns
(overall returns) of elections (referendum) are officially published." 5 7
Addressing the work of observers during the election itself, the
Election Code explicitly prohibits observers from (1) issuing ballots;
(2) polling voters either before or after they have voted; (3) receiving
ballots on behalf of voters; (4) marking a ballot for a voter, even if
requested; (5) participating in official vote counting; (6) acting in any
way that obstructs the election commission; (7) campaigning for
candidates or parties; (8) affecting the decision making of election
commissions; or (9) responding to questions posed by voters about
anything other than the individual's status as an observer.15 8
Observers must function independently and with the financial
support of either their sponsoring organizations or themselves, 159 and
they may not abuse their status as observers for purposes unrelated
to the election. 160

156. ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, supra note 124, art. 44.9;
Decision 7/27-4, supra note 128, pt. V, §§ 5.1.3, 5.1.9, 5.1.16.
157. ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, supra note 124, art. 41.3;

see also Decision 7/27-4, supra note 128, pt. VII, § 7.1 (outlining the term of authority
and termination of authorities of international observers). Of course, observers may not
commence their work until they have been registered by the CEC. See AZERBAIJANI
ELECTION CODE, supra note 124, art. 44.5 (noting the term of authority commences on
the day of registration).
158.

ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, supra note 124, art. 42.3;

see also Decision 7/27-4, supra note 128, pt. V, § 5.2 (listing prohibited behavior).
159.

ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, supra note 124, art. 44.6;

see also Decision 7/27-4, supra note 128, pt. III, §§ 3.1-3.2 (discussing the status of
international observers).
160.
ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, supra note 124, art.
44.10.
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As noted above, international observers in Azerbaijan enjoy the
right to offer suggestions and comments to agents of the election
commission during the administration of the election. 16 1 The
Election Code also requires commissioners to acknowledge receipt of
such suggestions by attaching . the international observer's
"opinion . . . to the protocol on either voting results or election
returns." 162 Finally, observers are guaranteed the right to speak
freely about the results of their missions, as both the Election Code
and CEC regulations allow them to "address the mass media and
conduct press conferences addressing election legislation, [as well as]
the preparation and conduct of elections."163
6.

Actions Required of Azerbaijan with Respect to International
Election Observers

Azerbaijan must fulfill certain obligations as the host country.
The Election Code maintains that "[i]nternational observers shall be
under the protection of the State while within the territory of the
Republic of Azerbaijan. Election commissions, state government
bodies[,] and municipalities shall be obliged to render the necessary
assistance to them."164 No provisions in the Election Code or CEC
regulations, however, seem to subject international observers to the
judiciary system of Azerbaijan.16 5
V. PROPOSING AN ANNEX TO THE UN DECLARATION OF
PRINCIPLES FOR INTERNATIONAL
ELECTION OBSERVATION

A. Concerns with the Declarationof Principles
for InternationalElection Observation
The Declaration of Principles for International Election
Observation represents a critical development in the standardization

161.
162.
163.

Id. art. 42.2.8.
Id. art. 42.5.
Id. art. 44.8; see also Decision 7/27-4, supra note 128, pt. V,

§

5.1.15

(explaining the rights and duties of international observers).
164.
ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, supra note 124, art. 44.7;
see also Decision 7/27-4, supra note 128, pt. III, § 3.1 (providing a similar provision).
165.

See generally ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, supra note

124 (lacking such a provision); Decision 7/27-4, supra note 128 (same).
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of the governance of international election observation missions.
Cameron Quinn argues that the Declaration has made international
election observation "one area with substantial international
agreement on standards. These agreements include the purpose of
observation, the conduct of international observers, and the
these
Notwithstanding
for
observation."166
standards
accomplishments, however, the Declaration still fails to provide
useful specifics and ultimately leaves the international communityboth states and INGOs alike-searching for further guidance.
Several concerns are evident. First, the Declaration is simply too
broad. Rather than establishing specific and detailed regulations
that states and international organizations can either use as
guidelines for making laws or adopt in full as their own law, it offers
a series of platitudes and aspirational goals. This breadth means
that despite the fact that thirty-two INGOs and IGOs signed the
Declaration, national laws and organizational regulations
promulgated in accordance with the Declaration are often quite
Second, the organization of the Declaration is
different.16 7
disappointing. In addition to the fact that it is presented as an
unadulterated list of twenty-four principles that lacks subject-matter
demarcations, the Declaration appends an equally general Code of
Conduct for International Election Observers that the drafters could
have integrated into the Declaration.16 8
In response to these concerns, this Note proposes the addition of
a detailed Annex to the Declaration that addresses all aspects of the
international election observation process, from its objectives and
purposes to the duties of host nations to the rights and obligations of
observers and observer organizations. This Part augments the
existing stipulations of the Declaration by using the best provisions of
various codes promulgated by INGOs and IGOs and the national laws
on international election observation discussed above. After this
discussion, the Note submits a structured and detailed draft of the
proposed Annex.16 9

166.
Cameron Quinn, Conduct of Election Day, in INTERNATIONAL ELECTION
PRINCIPLES: DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 241, 265 (John Hardin Young ed.,
2009).
Compare, e.g., On the Election of the President of the Russian Federation,
167.
Federal Law No. 19-FZ (2003), available at http://www.cikrf.ruleng/law/FL-19-FZ.jsp
(discussing the role of the observer throughout the law), with ELECTION CODE OF THE
REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, supra note 124, arts. 41-44 (dedicating three sections of the
code to the roles and responsibilities of observation missions).
168.
See generally Declaration, supra note 1 (highlighting a series of values that
should be upheld through the conduct of election observers).
169.
See infra app. A.
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B. A Discussion of the Elements of the ProposedAnnex
to the Declaration
1.

Purposes and Objectives of International Election Observation

The proposed Annex opens with an unambiguous statement of
the direct and indirect objectives of international election observation.
This provision recognizes first that the right to vote is a basic human
right that cannot be denied. The existing Declaration notes this fact
clearly, stating that individuals enjoy the basic right to "participate in
the government and public affairs of his or her country,"170 which
necessarily manifests itself in the right to vote. This language is
preserved.171 Second, the provision identifies the reason that free
and fair elections are so important: they demonstrate sovereignty and
legitimacy.172 Theodor Hanf has noted that "[m]ost lists of indicators
[used to determine the democratic nature of a political system] give
free and fair elections a prominent place.

. .

. [T]his is common sense

inasmuch as elections are the fundamental decision-making process
in any democracy worthy of the name."173 While the Declaration
already recognizes that elections are "an expression of sovereignty"
for the host country,174 it is important to explain this objective
further in order to provide background for the observation details
that follow.
Moving beyond the theoretical objectives of international election
observation, the opening provision of the Annex also recognizes the
more concrete purposes of international election observation:175 (1)
helping host countries administer credible elections, (2) establishing
lasting electoral programs that will enable host countries to hold free
and fair elections in the future,176 and (3) ushering "transitional
democracies" through their first foray into the electoral process.1 77

170.
Declaration, supra note 1, para. 2.
171.
See infra app. A, part I, § A.2 ("All citizens enjoy a basic human right to
participate in the public affairs of his country, which manifests itself in the right to
vote").
172.
See infra app. A, part I, § A.3.
173.
THEODOR HANF ET AL., OBSERVING DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONs: A EUROPEAN
APPROACH 4 (1995) (F.R.G.).
174.
Declaration, supranote 1, at 1.
175.
See infra app. A, part I, § B.1 (discussing concrete objectives of
International Election Observation).
176.
See supra Part II (discussing the history and contributions of International
Election Observation).
177.
See, e.g., Organizaci6n de los Estados Americanos, Informe de la Misidn de

Observaci6n Electoral Elecciones Generales de la Repablica de Nicaragua,ELECTORAL
OBSERVATION MISSION REP., Mar. 3, 2008, available at http://www.oas.org/
sap/english/txtscooperacion-publicacionesmisiones.htm
(describing the observation
mission of Nicaragua's 2006 election during a time of extreme political fragility).
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Countries seeking to affirm their status as international democracies
have an interest in hosting elections widely recognized as credible:
"[F]ree and fair elections are a crucial criterion of democracy. The
external legitimisation bestowed on election outcomes declared 'free
and fair' by credible international observer missions can contribute
considerably to their acceptance by all political forces involved in the
This principle is true for all countries,
electoral process ."... .178
regardless of their established or transitional status. In addition to
this general goal, international election observation serves the
important purpose of assisting "the appearance of new states as
former empires disintegrate. The desire to have elections legitimised
as 'free and fair' is particularly strong in the cases of 'transitional
17 9
elections' and 'independence elections."'
Finally, the opening provision of the proposed Annex addresses
the broader international implications of international election
observation. 8 0 It recognizes that the principles of sovereignty and
democracy are relevant not only to the host nations but also to
democratic systems worldwide, which "have an interest in healthy
democracies beyond their immediate borders."1' 8 For this reason, the
provision expressly recognizes both maintenance of peace and the
promotion of democracy as goals of international election
observation.182
2.

Respecting National Sovereignty

The proposed Annex next recognizes that the objectives of
international election observation, however crucial, must never
encroach on a state's national sovereignty.' 8 3
In other words,
international election observers must refrain from interfering in
internal decision-making processes reserved for the host state or its
government.184 While many of the other limitations that national

HANF ET AL., supra note 173, at 7.
178.
179.
Id. at 5.
180.
See infra app. A, part I, § C.
181.
HANF ET AL., supra note 173, at 5 ("Democratic elections are an infinitely
more desirable form of conflict resolution than violence, both for those immediately
affected and for the international community as a whole.").
182.
See infra app. A, part I, § C.2 (lauding democratic governments for their
potential to "help resolve conflicts without violence" and "contribute to the
maintenance of global peace").
183.
See id. part II (discussing the importance of maintaining national
sovereignty).
184.
Inter-American Democratic Charter, supra note 57, arts. 23-24 (providing
that because elections are a matter of national sovereignty, observers shall only
participate at the request of the host nation); Copenhagen Document, supra note 45,
para. 8 ("[O]bservers will undertake not to interfere in the electoral proceedings.");
Declaration, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that observers must respect national
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laws and INGO regulations place on observers imply the need to
protect national sovereignty, the proposed Annex nevertheless
includes an unambiguous statement that observers shall respect
national sovereignty. Along with a broad statement that observers
shall respect the sovereignty of the host state, this provision of the
Annex provides two sub-provisions clarifying this obligation: (1) that
all observers shall remain politically neutral,18 5 and (2) that an
observer's role is simply to observe passively rather than intervene. 186
3.

Invitation of International Election Observers

International election observers should conduct their missions
only if the host nation has extended them an invitation. Each
invitation may differ in form-national election laws may provide for
them or regional agreements between nations may mandate
them 1 8 7-but the bottom line is that no organization or individual

sovereignty and domestic laws); ELECTORAL COMM'N'S FORUM OF SADC COUNTRIES &
ELECTORAL INST. OF S. AF., supra note 10, at 30-31 (requiring observers to act
impartially and refrain from interfering in the electoral process); OSCE GUIDELINES,
supra note 49, at 24 (establishing that observers may not interfere in voting, counting,
or voters' decision-making). National election laws with provisions pertaining to
international election observation similarly confirm that observers have an obligation
to respect state sovereignty. See, e.g., Decision 7/27-4, supra note 128, pt. V, § 5.2.9
(prohibiting observers in Azerbaijan from "interfer[ing] in the adoption of the decisions
of the relevant election commission").
185.
HANF ET AL., supra note 173, at 13 ("[O]bservers ... are bound to maintain
strict political neutrality . . .. They must make a point of concealing their attitudes. A
fundamental rule of behaviour for all observers is impartiality towards all political
groupings."); see also Inter-American Democratic Charter, supra note 57, art. 24 ("They
shall be conducted in an objective, impartial, and transparent manner and with the
appropriate technical expertise."); ELECTORAL COMM'N'S FORUM OF SADC COUNTRIES &
ELECTORAL INST. OF S. AF., supra note 10, at 32 (stating that observers should strive
"to act in a strictly impartial and unbiased manner").
186.
HANF ET AL., supra note 173, at 13-14. Defining the observers' function as
follows:
[T]heir task is to observe, not to help or to intervene. Observers watch, ask
questions, take notes and report to their organisation....
. Observers can refer to and even quote the applicable statutory
regulations, refraining from further commentary. In any event, they should
point out that the responsible authorities alone are empowered to take
decisions. Even if they observe occurrences that they feel are wrong or illegal,

they may not intervene, but must restrict themselves to recording the incident. In
short: observers should see themselves as chroniclers, not as electoral officials,
and act accordingly.
Id. (second emphasis added); see also Copenhagen Document, supra note 45, para. 8
("Such observers will undertake not to interfere in the electoral proceedings.").
187.
See, e.g., On the Election of the President of the Russian Federation art. 10,
§ 2, Federal Law No. 19-FZ (2003), available at http://www.cikrf.ruleng/law/FL-19FZ.jsp ("The rules for the participation of foreign (international) observers in
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may enter a nation to conduct election observation without the
consent of the host nation.1 88
The requirement that organizations and individuals possess
invitations before entering a host nation not only protects national
sovereignty but also ensures that the observation missions
undertake all necessary preparations before beginning their work.189
For this reason, some analysts have recommended that host nations
"invite . . . observer mission[s] . . . at least four months before the

election date.
It is more difficult not only to make proper
preparations for the mission at shorter notice, but also to adequately
examine whether the other preconditions are met."190 In reality, the
exact length of the advance notice required should depend on case-bycase analyses since different circumstances in host nations will
require different preparations.
Nevertheless, a minimum
requirement is reasonable.
Finally, an invitation represents the crucial first recognition of
the extent of an observer's mandate.1 91 It binds the host nation to
opening the electoral process to observers and ensures international
election observation missions that they will be able to conduct their
work freely.19 2 To achieve this dual objective, invitations must
include language that goes beyond simple authorization of entry into
the country; they should also include specific details about the steps
of the electoral process over which observers may preside. Ideally,
nations should grant observers access to the entire electoral process,
extending from "creation of the election authorities, through voter
registration, the nomination of candidates, the election campaign[,]
and the ballot, to the counting of votes and the dealing with

monitoring the preparation and conduct of the election of the President of the Russian
Federation shall be established by the international treaties of the Russian Federation,
this Federal Law, other federal law."); ELECTORAL COMM'N'S FORUM OF SADC
COUNTRIES & ELECTORAL INST. OF S. AF., supra note 10, at 31 ("The EMB or relevant
authority must invite observer missions.").
188.
See Declaration, supra note 1, at 4 (acknowledging that an invitation from
the host country is a vital prerequisite for launching efforts to observe elections); HANF
ET AL., supra note 173, at 9 ("The government concerned must invite the observer
mission. . . ."); MERLOE, supra note 41, at 7 ("Intergovernmental organizations
typically require an invitation or request from member governments before they can
engage in such matters.").
189.
HANF ET AL., supra note 173, at 9.
190.
Id. For a more in-depth discussion of those "other preconditions," see infra
Part V.B.4.
191.
See HANF ET AL., supra note 173, at 10 (stating that the host nation must
guarantee certain preconditions for observer missions). For more on what obligations,
rights, and duties are included in an observer's mandate, see infra Part V.B.5-V.B.6.
192.
See HANF ET AL., supra note 173, at 9-10 (listing preconditions meant to
ensure the ability of observer missions "to go about their work unhindered and on
reasonable technical facilities").
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objections."s93 This list is certainly not exhaustive, but it highlights
critical steps and reinforces that laws should not limit election
observers only to the observation of activities occurring on voting
days.
4.

Obligations and Duties of Host Nations Requisite to the
Acceptance of an Invitation

Before international election observers commit to undertaking
observation missions in host nations, it is essential that those nations
ensure the observation organizations that they will "be[] able to go
about their work unhindered and on reasonable technical facilities.
To ensure this, it is necessary to set strict preconditions for observer
missions."194 It is particularly important that the observer missions
obtain an assurance of "reasonable probability" that the election
process will take place under peaceful circumstances (i.e., not during
a national civil war).' 9 5 Conducting election observation missions
during violent conflicts would not only put the observers in grave
danger but also be entirely ineffective since the national attention
would be committed to resolving the conflict rather than completing
the election.1 96 Indeed, certain particularly vulnerable groups might
also feel unable to express their true political will. While the
international community may choose to address such conditions
through other methods, the presence of international election
observation missions alone will not accomplish that goal.
International election observation missions must also ensure
that the host country possesses an electoral law that is conducive to
free and fair elections. Critical to the definition of international
election observation is the principle that election monitors observe
the implementation of-and do not create or shape-already existing
electoral laws.1 9 7 For these reasons, election observers must make
certain that the host nation's "electoral laws and its implementing
regulations ... meet democratic standards... . Otherwise, the

193.
Id.
194.
Id. at 9.
195.
Id.
196.
Id. ("It is unlikely that elections held under conditions approaching civil
war will be democratic. They are certainly not suitable for external observers.').
197.
See, e.g., The Carter Center, Democracy Program, What is Election
Observation?, http://www.cartercenter.org/peace/democracy/nav-questionl.html
(last
visited Mar. 29, 2010) ("The overarching goal of election observation is to support
efforts to strengthen democratic processes and institutions and to support the conduct
of elections that meet international standards, are peaceful, and have
credible results.").
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planned elections will, by definition, not be free and fair, and there is
no point in sending observers." 9 8
These very laws and regulations must also include assurances
that host nations will meet certain specific preconditions, detailed
explicitly in the Annex, that will make the process democratic.
National election laws, international principles, and scholarly
treatises provide detailed insight into what these preconditions
should include. An initial prerequisite is that host nations must
allow the observation organizations to choose their own observers.1 99
Nations shall not discriminate-for any reason-against observers or
preference certain observers over others.2 00
Second, as the invitation should indicate, the host nation must
guarantee observers full access to the entire electoral process. 20 1 This
unfettered access shall also extend to all electoral officials stationed
throughout the observation area at any time during the process, 202
and host nations should ensure that "open and ongoing
communication" can take place between their officials and the
observation organizations. 203 Some scholars have even recommended
that host nations designate officials to act specifically as liaisons
between the nation's government and the observation missions. 204
Finally, observation missions should only enter host nations if
those nations pledge to provide vital services during the observation
period. Such services include, but are not limited to, 1) means of
transportation; (2) communication facilities and equipment; (3)
equipment necessary to fulfill observation duties; (4) police
protection; and (5) emergency medical care. 205
In practice,
guarantees to provide these services have been vague. Both Russia
and Azerbaijan, for example, recognize that international election
observers are under the patronage of their government and,

HANF ET AL., supra note 173, at 9.
199.
Id. at 10 ("The dispatching body must be completely free in its choice of
observers. Attempts to exclude or restrict the choice to specific persons or groups of
persons must be decisively rejected.").
200.
Id.
201.
Id.; supra Parts IV.A.3, IV.B.3 (discussing Russian and Azerbaijani election
law provisions that grant access to observers at all stages of the election process).
202.
HANF ET AL., supra note 173, at 10 ("The inviting government must
guarantee that the observers will be free to contact unmonitored any person at any time
and anywhere for the entire period of the electoral process."); see also On the Election of
the President of the Russian Federation art. 23, § 1, Federal Law No. 19-FZ (2003),
('The relevant election
available at http://www.cikrf.ru/eng/lawlFL-19-FZ.jsp
commission shall make arrangements to ensure free access of these persons to its
meeting and to the premises.").
203.
HANF ET AL., supra note 173, at 10.
204.
Id.
205.
Id.
198.
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therefore, are entitled to all necessary assistance. 206 Neither nation's
law, however, offers any specifics of what that assistance entails. 20 7
The Annex to the Declaration both recognizes that observers are
legally under the patronage of the host nation and delineates at least
the most vital services that a host nation must provide.20 8
5.

Accreditation of International Election Observers

Individuals participating in international election observation
missions must receive accreditation. 20 9 Accreditation procedures
ensure that election officials can easily identify sanctioned observers,
guarantee that observers are able to move freely throughout the
observation area, and prevent fraudulent observation attempts.
Indeed, the principles of OSCE, 210 SADC, 2 1 ' and NDI, 2 12 as well as
the Declaration, 213 recognize that host nations must provide a
proficient accreditation procedure for all rightfully invited observers.
National laws should do more than just mandate accreditation-they
should formally establish the requirements of observer status, the
administrative procedures necessary to achieve such status, and the
grounds for revocation of that status.2 14
On the Election of the President of the Russian Federation art. 24, § 7,
206.
Federal Law No. 19-FZ (2003), available at http://www.cikrf.ruleng/law/FL-19-FZ.jsp
("[Observers are] under the patronage of the government of the Russian Federation"
and that Russian officials must "render the necessary assistance to [those] foreign
(international) observers."); ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, supra
note 124, art. 44.7 ("International observers shall be under the protection of the State
while within the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Election commissions, state
government bodies and municipalities shall be obliged to render the necessary
assistance to them.").
207.
See On the Election of the President of the Russian Federation art. 24, § 7,
Federal Law No. 19-FZ (2003), available at http://www.cikrf.ruleng/law/FL-19-FZ.jsp
(lacking such specificity); ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, supra note
124, art. 44.7 (same).
208.
See infra app. A, part W.A.
HANF ET AL., supra note 173, at 10.
209.
210.
OSCE GUIDELINES, supra note 49.
211.
ELECTORAL COMM'N'S FORUM OF SADC COUNTRIES & ELECTORAL INST. OF
S. AF., supranote 10.
MERLOE, supra note 41.
212.
Declaration, supra note 1.
213.
While some organizations' principles suggest that accreditation should only
214.
be a formality (for example, the Declaration notes that host countries should guarantee
observers the right to accreditation, Declaration, supra note 1, para. 12(g)), others
seem to allow the host countries a more active role in establishing the procedures and
requirements for accreditation, see, e.g., OSCE GUIDELINES, supra note 49, at 24
(stating that national laws should clearly specify which governmental organization
holds the authority to accredit observers). As in all areas of international election
observation, procedures must respect both national sovereignty and individual rights.
See infra app. A, parts I-II (acknowledging the right to vote as a basic human right
and the importance of respecting national sovereignty). Therefore, while countries

2010]

INTERNA TIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION

799

As this Note has emphasized, respect for national sovereignty is
essential. For that reason, each host nation should have the abilitythrough its own laws-to establish the specific accreditation
procedures required of observers. The Annex to the Declaration
offers a set of standardized accreditation procedures.2 1 5 Host nations
and international election observation organizations referencing the
Declaration may then easily choose either to adopt the procedures
already set forth in the Annex or to use them as a foundation for their
own procedures. The bottom line is that many nations-namely those
with limited resources to develop their own laws-may benefit from
standardized procedures that make the accreditation process more
efficient. So long as the ultimate choice of procedures rests with the
nation itself, sovereignty will remain unthreatened.
Drawing from the Russian Election Law and Azerbaijani
Election Code, the proposed Annex divides accreditation procedures
into two primary categories: (1) qualifications for obtaining observer
status and (2) administrative measures. With respect to the first
category, both Russia and Azerbaijan shift the burden of determining
who may be accredited to the invitation phase, extending invitations
only to those who-so long as they meet all other legitimate
Whether such a
limitations-are qualified to observe. 216
determination occurs before or after the host nation extends
invitations is irrelevant;2 1 7 what matters, however, is that the host
nation's laws clearly articulate the qualifications for serving as an
observer. Those qualifications include minimum age, a clean legal
record in all previous election observation missions, lack of political
affiliations with any groups or individuals within the host nation, and
lack of financial associations with any political entities within the
host nation. 2 18
The proposed Annex further establishes specific application
requirements for invited observers. Completed applications both
allow the host nation to prepare for the arrival of the observer and

should be granted as much autonomy as possible in devising general requirements for
observers, there must also be oversight to ensure that countries do not selectively
discriminate against certain classes of potential observers.
215.
See infra app. A.
216.
See supra Parts IV.A.2, IV.B.2 (discussing the components of this phase in
both Russian and Azerbaijani law).
It should be noted, however, that it would seem to be more efficient to
217.
determine qualifications beforehand and invite only those generally meeting those
qualifications (i.e., international election observation organizations the country deems
to be fair and credible). A second round of background investigation can then be
implemented during the administrative measures phase of the accreditation process to
ensure, for example, that if there is an age limit for observers, no one under that limit
is able to observe.
218.
See infra app. A, part V.D (listing qualifications for obtaining observer
status).
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permit the host nation to conduct final background checks of
individual observers to ensure that each meets any legitimately
The
prescribed criteria, such as a minimum age restriction.
Azerbaijani Election Code provides an excellent guideline for the
requirements of an application, including full name, nationality, place
of residence, valid government identification (such as a driver's
license), and two photographs. 219 The application should also provide
space for the applicant to indicate whether he is working on behalf of
a political party, specific candidate, or INGO. 220 The Azerbaijani
Election Code requires that applicants submit this information at
least ten days before the start of the election. 221 While such
deadlines are meant to allow the host nation time to confirm the
credibility of both the information provided and the applicant, a
stringent deadline of any kind risks diminishing or even eliminating
election observation missions. In addition, modern technology could
allow most governments to conduct their vetting process quickly and
easily. Recognizing the importance of observation and the everincreasing ability to use modern technology to confirm applicant
information, the proposed Annex institutes a "recommended"
deadline but also establishes a provisional application process
whereby potential observers may apply at any time-even on the day
of the election-and receive permission to commence observation as
soon as the host nation can complete an expedited approval process.
To complete the accreditation process, the host nation must

provide approved observers with identifying documents. The Russian
Election Law requires only that the election commission provide the
observer with an ID card and that he carry a copy of his invitation
and a second identifying document. 222 The requirements of the
Azerbaijani Election Code better represent what the Annex
mandates. 223 Election commissions should issue ID badges that (1)
are printed in the languages of both the host country as well as the
observer's native country; (2) include the observer's name,
nationality, and local address; (3) indicate whether the observer
represents any candidate, party, or organization; and (4) note where
the observer may conduct his work. 224 Furthermore, accreditation
badges should display the observer's picture prominently and be

219.

ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, supra note 124, art. 40.6.

Id.
220.
Id.
221.
222.
On the Election of the President of the Russian Federation art. 24, § 3,
Federal Law No. 19-FZ (2003), available at http://www.cikrf.ru/eng/law/FL-19-FZ.jsp.
223.

Compare ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, supra note 124,

arts. 40.6, 44.4 (detailing requirements for observer identity cards), with infra app. A,
partV.H (envisioning similar requirements).
See infra app. A, part V.H.
224.
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printed on a material difficult to forge. Host countries may consider
requiring that each observer also carry an additional, personal form
of identification for clarification purposes. 22 5
Finally, the Annex explains when host countries may revoke
previously granted accreditation.
In most cases, standards for
revocation can be made simple by noting that a host nation may
revoke accreditation at its discretion if an observer violates national
law, international legal norms, or his individual mandate. 226
Revocation of accreditation should not be understood to strip the host
nation of the right to prosecute observers, where appropriate, for
actual legal violations.
6.

An Observer's Mandate: Rights and Reach of International
Election Observers

Once observers successfully register to observe elections in a host
nation, it is vital that they understand the reach and rights of their
mandate. This substantive work is undoubtedly the most important
part of the entire election observation mission, and observers must
therefore know exactly what their status allows them to do. An
observer's mandate includes both a general temporal tenure and more
The Declaration makes this murky
specific elemental rights.
distinction, noting that observers (1) should conduct election
observation over a timeframe that includes the pre-election, electionday, and post-election periods, 227 and (2) shall monitor elements of
the process such as voter registration, the delineation of election
districts, and actual voting on election day. 228
Given the scarcity of such important information in the
Declaration, the proposed Annex not only includes a similar temporal
mandate but also expounds on the ambiguous language of the
Declaration by highlighting several specific elements of the entire
electoral process over which observers' mandates should extend. 229
The proposed Annex covers the time from which the precincts
begin election-related work through the publication of election
results. 230 Although neither national election law discussed herein

See infra app. A, part V.I.
225.
226.
See infra app. A, part V.J.
227.
Supra text accompanying note 81.
228.
Supra text accompanying note 82.
229.
See infra app. A, part VI (breaking down observer duties into specific
elements of the electoral process).
230.
See infra app. A; see also HANF ET AL., supra note 173, at 13 (stating that
observers have unquestioned "rights to observe everything connected with the electoral
process and to ask questions in this connection"); supra text accompanying notes 11112, 154 (noting that both Russian and Azerbaijani election laws permit international
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specifically recognizes the right to observe an election's preparatory
stages, their general temporal provisions imply that observers should
be present and working during the pre-election period 23 1 that
includes voter registration, the nomination of candidates,
campaigning, and election preparations. 232 Observers should also
examine whether host nations are fulfilling their obligation to ensure
that voter registration facilities or methods are available in all parts
of the country and open at times that will give all interested persons
the ability to register. 233 In particular, observers must assess
whether host nations (or other groups or individuals) are preventing
specific classes of people from registering to vote 234-a gross violation
of free and fair election practices. If observers do witness such
discriminatory practices, they should note them and any possible
explanations.2 35
The proposed Annex next establishes an observer's mandate over
the nomination of candidates, noting that host nations must allow
anyone who wishes to run for election-and is otherwise legally
eligible-to do so. 236 Many countries have legitimate laws such as
nationality requirements or age limits that candidates must meet, 237
but observers should note any improper limitations on eligibility,
such as those based on race or gender. Observers should also monitor
whether the host nation adequately publishes and distributes details
and deadlines related to the nominations process.23 8 The availability
of such information is vital to ensuring that host nations provide all
citizens-not just those attuned to the political process-an equal
opportunity to participate in the electoral process. Observers should
record any irregularities or ostensibly discriminatory practices and
may choose to conduct background research or interviews to evaluate
any potential irregularities. 239

observers to inspect voting results, election returns, the completion of protocols of
voting results, and the counting and recounting of votes).
231.
See supra text accompanying notes 110, 154 (noting that Russian election
law permits international observers to inspect empty ballot boxes and early returns,
while Azerbaijani law and CEC regulations allow international observers to "observe
the implementation of election activities").
232.
See HANF ET AL., supra note 173, at 20-22 (outlining general pre-election
activities).
233.
Id. at 20.
234.
Id. at 20, 24.
235.
Id. at 24.
236.
See id. at 21 ("For elections to be equal, all candidates or list of candidates
or parties that fulfil [sic] legal requirements must be allowed to run.").
237.
Cf. id. at 24 (noting that observation should monitor the "implementation of
legal provisions").
238.
Id. at 24.
239.
Id.
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All candidates must also enjoy an equally free and fair right to
campaign. To prevent certain political groups from facing unequal
regulations, observers must above all monitor the host nation's
commitment to guaranteeing "effective freedom of assembly and of
opinion for all competing political forces." 240 In practice, this means
that every candidate and party must have the same access to venues
and audiences. 2 41 Laws must prohibit and observers should note any
tactics meant to limit a candidate's ability to campaign, such as fear
and intimidation. 242
The final element of the pre-voting period subject to the scrutiny
of observers is the preparation of the polls for election day. Prior to
the election, host nations afford observers stationed in that nation the
right to "survey the state of [election] preparations approximately one
month before polling."243
The proposed Annex recognizes that
election-day voting observation would mean little if the preparations
for election day failed to ensure an equal playing field for both
candidates and voters. Thus, several pre-voting procedures that
observers should monitor include the creation of national, regional,
and local election authorities; the training of election personnel; the
nomination and accreditation of candidates' and parties' agents; the
choosing of polling stations; and the distribution of necessary
equipment and election materials-including voting machines, ballot
boxes, paper ballots, writing utensils, and other necessities-to those
polling stations. 244
Moving to election day, the proposed Annex recognizes that
"close and extensive observation of what happens at polling stations
on the polling days is the heart of any electoral observation." 2 45
Election day observation, broadly speaking, should cover "[a]ll details
of electoral procedures"; 246 indeed, even the national electoral laws
this Note has examined identify the mandated rights of observers on
voting days. 247 Observers must first be able to determine whether
polling stations are prepared to operate as soon as voters arrive. This
includes examining empty ballot boxes and those containing ballots of

240.
Id. at 21.
241.
Id.
242.
Id.
243.
Id. at 22.
244.
See id. at 27 (noting the importance of these activities in assuring a fair
election process).
Id. at 22.
245.
246.
Id.
247.
See supra text accompanying notes 111, 155 (noting, respectively, that
Russian and Azerbaijani election laws provide observers the right to witness voting day
activities).
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early voters (where applicable) and studying voter rolls 248 to ensure
that when regular voting begins later in the day, the votes placed in
the ballot box are legitimate and undiluted.
The proposed Annex next recommends that observers be present
at the polling station(s) throughout election day voting.2 49 This
allows observers to monitor steps of the voting day procedures
ranging from voter sign-in to the preparation of results protocols. 250
The temporal mandate covers other steps including the counting of
votes when polls close, the tallying of unused ballots, the preparation
of any protocol or other documents related to voting or vote results,
the obtaining of copies of such documents, and the transfer of those
documents from local precincts to the national election commission.25 1
Observers should, of course, record supportable assertions as to the
validity and credibility of these procedures. Finally, observers must
have the right to observe the tallying of any recounts, though likely
not on election day itself. 252
These rights represent the minimum that host nations should
Many countries (including
afford international observers.
Azerbaijan) go one step further in including an important, yet still
disputed, right: the right of observers to provide real-time
constructive criticism to election workers.25 3 As stated throughout
this Note, it is imperative that international observers avoid
infringing on the sovereign rights of host nations. The question
remains, however, whether the provision of advice or constructive
criticism during the election period should be considered an
interference with electoral procedures ("election assistance") or

248.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 110, 155 (noting that Russian
election law permits international observers to inspect empty ballot boxes and early
returns and Azerbaijani law allows observers to examine ballot distribution and
tallying).
249.
See infra app. A, part VI.D.1.
250.
See infra app. A, part VI.D.1.
251.
See infra app. A, part VI.D.1; see also HANF ET AL., supra note 173, at 22
should be closely
("[Tihe count and subsequent aggregation of election results ....
observed. Observer missions should be prepared for delays in counting and compiling
results and not disband prematurely."). An observer's mandate may also include the
right to affix his signature to any official documents (in essence, to confirm the
accuracy and validity of those documents), see supra text accompanying note 111
(noting that Russian election law grants observers the right to sign election results to
indicate their approval), but the host nation should exclusively make any decision to
allow or require an observer's signature on an official document. Given the importance
of respecting national sovereignty, infra app. A, part II, a host nation's decision not to
include an observer's signature should not affect that observer's ultimate assessment of
the fairness of the voting procedures.
252.
See infra app. A, part VI.E.2; see also supra text accompanying notes 111,
155 (indicating that Russian and Azerbaijani laws grant this right).
253.
See supra text accompanying note 155 (noting that Azerbaijani law allows
observers to provide precinct directors with constructive comments).
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simply real-time advice to workers that they can choose to accept or
ignore.
Hanf provides some insight into the difference between
election assistance and election observation:
Election assistance can take many forms: drawing up an electoral law,
planning and organizing an electoral authority, training electoral
officers, etc. The wider the scope of assistance, the more advisable it is
to maintain a strict separation between the organisation and personnel
of observation, on the one hand, and assistance on the other, similar to
254
the separation between the execution and evaluation of a project.

Furthermore, observers have the right-even the obligation-to
report fully the findings of their observation mission, including
criticisms of the process and recommendations for the future. 255 If
observers are allowed to make such constructive suggestions after the
election is over, then there seems no logical reason to forbid them
from offering such advice during the voting. The right to do so would
simply allow election officials from the host nation to correct errors
immediately, thus making the very election being observed-not just
future elections-more free and fair. The dispositive difference
between interference and non-interference lies in the fact that
observers offering real-time advice would simply be making on-thespot judgments about the implementation of national laws; they
would not be creating the laws, organizing the electoral authorities,
or undertaking any other responsibility that one might construe as
sovereign interference.
For these reasons, the proposed Annex
affords observers the right to offer officials at polling stations realtime advice if they realize that authorities are blatantly
implementing a national election law improperly. Observers should
record how officials had been implementing the law, the fact that
they offered advice, and the effect, if any, of that advice.
If national election laws allow observers to monitor pre-election,
election-day, and post-election procedures, observer missions will be
able to execute their duties and fulfill the objectives of international
election observation.
7.

An Observer's Limits: Obligations of and Limits on International
Election Observers

Understanding the limits on and obligations of the individuals
undertaking the observation mission is also critical. Harkening back
yet again to the notion of respecting national sovereignty, an
observer's most important obligation is to respect and submit to the

254.
HANF ET AL., supra note 173, at 15.
255.
See infra Part V.B.8 (discussing duties of an international observer to offer
accurate reports and provide recommendations).
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laws of the host country. 256 Furthermore, the requirement that
observers obey national law extends to their dealings with officials of
the state, demanding that observers cooperate with all local
agents.25 7
A second obligation of international observers is that they
remain completely neutral and unbiased throughout the electoral
process. Indeed, the Declaration and every international declaration
of principles, national election law, and treatise on the subject
emphasizes the importance of observer neutrality.2 58 The proposed
Annex thus requires observers to maintain strict neutrality at all
times.
But it does not stop there. Because most specific limitations on
election observers only state that they must remain uninvolved and
impartial, the proposed Annex identifies more specifically those areas
of the election process in which observers may not participate. These
areas include voting, 259 issuing ballots to voters, 260 polling voters, 261
helping voters vote (such as by marking the ballot for them),262

256.
On the Election of the President of the Russian Federation art. 24, § 7,
Federal Law No. 19-FZ (2003), available at http://www.cikrf.ruleng/law/FL-19-FZ.jsp
(stating that observers are under the patronage of the Russian Federation, and subject
to its laws and criminal prosecution if they are to break those laws); ELECTORAL
COMM'N's FORUM OF SADC COUNTRIES & ELECTORAL INST. OF S. AF., supra note 10, at
32 (mandating that observers must follow the laws of the country and respect cultures
and practices); HANF ET AL., supra note 173, at 13 ("The observers are subject to the
laws of the country in which they are operating. They do not enjoy diplomatic
immunity.... [T]hey enjoy the same privileges as the citizens of the country.").
257.
See HANF ET AL., supra note 173, at 55 ("The observer shall abide by the
decisions of all electoral authorities, including requests to leave a voting station or any
specific area."); supra note 66 (discussing the SADC principle mandating that observers
follow the laws of the country and respect cultures and practices).
258.
See, e.g., ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, supra note 124,
arts. 42.3, 44.6, 44.10 (prohibiting observers from support or campaigning for a
candidate or party); ELECTORAL COMM'N's FORUM OF SADC COUNTRIES & ELECTORAL
INST. OF S. AF., supra note 10, at 30-31 (emphasizing that observers must act
impartially and without either prejudice or favoritism toward any party, individual, or
part of the electoral process); HANF ET AL., supra note 173, at 55 ("Observers shall
maintain strict neutrality in the conduct of their duties."); supra note 55 (noting that
the OSCE prohibits interference with voting, counting, or voters' decision-making).
259.
See infra app. A, part VII.B.2; see also supra note 55 (noting the OSCE's
prohibition on observers' participation in voting activities); cf. supratext accompanying
note 117 (stating that Russian election law prohibits observers from taking "advantage
of their status to carry on activities unrelated to monitoring").
260.
See infra app. A, part VII.B.3; see also supra text accompanying note 158
(noting that Azerbaijani election law prohibits observers from issuing ballots).
261.
See infra app. A, part VII.B.4; see also supra text accompanying note 158
(noting that Azerbaijani election law prohibits observers from polling voters).
262.
See infra app. A, part VII.B.5; see also supra text accompanying note 158
(noting that Azerbaijani election law prohibits observers from marking ballots for
voters, even if so requested).
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influencing or lobbying voters, 263 partaking in the official vote
counting, 264 or responding to voters' questions about subjects
unrelated to observation. 2 65
Finally, the proposed Annex seeks to ensure that observers do
not interfere with or obstruct the work of national election
It thus includes provisions prohibiting general
authorities.
obstruction of the electoral authorities, 266 forbidding observers from
abusing their status for purposes unrelated to observation of the
election, 267 allowing precincts and polling stations to keep a record of
the presence of election observers, 268 and directing observers to work
independently and without influence from groups or individuals
besides their own observation mission. 269
8.

Reporting Duties of International
Observation Missions

Election

Observers

and

In its final article, the proposed Annex recognizes that an
observer must report his findings at the conclusion of his mission.
The Declaration provides only that observers should offer accurate
and impartial reports to the public, the press, or both that announce
their findings and offer recommendations for improving the electoral
process. 270 Similarly-although it is not in their power to dictate the

263.
See infra app. A, part VII.B.6; see also supra note 55 (citing the OSCE's
prohibition on observer interference with voters' decisions); supra text accompanying
note 158 (noting that Azerbaijani election law prohibits observers from political
campaigning).
264.
See infra app. A, part VII.B.7; see also supra note 55 (citing the OSCE's
prohibition on observer participation in vote-counting); supra text accompanying note
158 (noting that Azerbaijani law forbids observer participation in vote-counting).
265.
See infra app. A, part VII.B.8; see also supra text accompanying note 158
(noting that Azerbaijani law prohibits observers from responding to voters' questions
about anything other than the individual's status as an observer).
See infra app. A, part VII.C.1.
266.
267.
See infra app. A, part VII.C.2; see also supra text accompanying notes 117,
160 (explaining Russian and Azerbaijani laws contain similar provisions prohibiting
abuses).
268.
See infra app. A, part VIID; see also supra text note 115 and accompanying
text (citing the Russian election law provision that requires precinct record-keeping of
observers). Such a provision not only ensures that the host nation maintains a record of
potentially disruptive observers, but it also guarantees that the host nation and
legitimate observation missions can work together to be certain that no fraudulent
observers worked (or are working) the polls.
See infra app. A, part VII.C.3; see also supra text accompanying note 116
269.
(noting the Russian law mandate that observers work only with their official parent
organizations); supra text accompanying note 159 (citing the Azerbaijani requirement
that observers act independently, using only their own money or funds of their
organizations).
270.
See supra note 93 and accompanying text (quoting the Declaration's
reporting requirements).
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questions on which observers should report-both the Russian
Election Law and Azerbaijani Election Code permit observers to
comment publically on the election process through press conferences
and the mass media. 271 These provisions provide an important
foundation for an observer's ability to comment on electoral processes,
but they remain too broad and fail to offer even a sample of the
questions that an observer's final report should answer.
The
proposed Annex remedies this shortcoming.
Hanf describes election observers as "'instant administration [s]'
that ha[ve] to provide information for a final, substantiated
evaluation of the election on the basis of defined criteria."272
Accurate and honest reporting is essential to the primary goal of
international election observation: improving elections so that they
may become free and fair.27 3 For this reason, it is vital that reporting
not only occur but also be standardized so that observers answer
critical questions about the electoral process.2 74 In order to fulfill
these goals, the proposed Annex establishes two reporting techniques
applicable throughout the observation period.
First, observers
conducting missions on the ground prior to election day should begin
by reviewing the host nation's election laws and regulations to ensure
that the franchise is universal, all votes are counted once, the ballot
is secret, no one is improperly excluded from voting (i.e., on account of
race, gender, etc.), all political parties are eligible to participate, and
all candidates are able to campaign. 2 75 Furthermore, these preelection day observers should take notes that address these issues, as
well as whether (1) all eligible parties are legally able to field
candidates, (2) all candidates enjoy equal legal footing to run a
campaign, (3) there is a fair voter registration process that does not
improperly discriminate, and (4) there exists freedom of assembly and
campaigning. 2 76

271.
Supra text accompanying notes 119, 121, 163. Indeed, Azerbaijani election
law grants observers the right to offer suggestions and comments to election
commissioners during the actual election regarding the implementation of the existing
electoral laws. ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, supra note 124, art.
42.2.8. For a discussion of this sort of real-time observation and reporting, see supra
Part V.B.6.
272.
HANF ET AL., supra note 173, at 52.
273.
See Inter-American Democratic Charter, supra note 57, pt. V (requiring
that observers or observation missions provide detailed reports of their findings to OAS
leadership); ELECTORAL COMM'N'S FORUM OF SADC COUNTRIES & ELECTORAL INST. OF
S. AF., supra note 10, at 31 (urging observers to create and distribute impartial and
professional press releases as well as assessment reports meant to help host nations'
election commissions identify and address concerns with the electoral process).
274.
See, e.g., HANF ET AL., supra note 173, at 52 ("In most cases, . . . observer
reporting will be a matter of filling in and filing . .. survey observation forms.").
275.
Id. at 18, 21.
276.
Id. at 18.
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Second, the proposed Annex exhorts observers to direct careful
attention to election day proceedings. During this period, observers
must not only continue to monitor whether the host nation fairly
implements its election laws but also adjudge whether election
officials improperly turn away voters at the polls, destroy or
inappropriately handle or count ballots, or in any other way misuse
their power in an effort to affect the outcome of the election.
Throughout the observation process, international election
observation missions should provide observers with a standardized
reporting form. Various missions may, as the proposed Annex
encourages, work together to formulate a single form so that host
nations and international organizations reviewing the findings from
an election need only examine one template. As outlined in the
proposed Annex, the forms should include both specific "yes or no"
questions related to the various aspects of the election process and
blank space for observers to provide additional commentary where
necessary. Observation missions should then compile all reports that
their respective observers file and create a formal report reviewing
the scrutinized aspects of the election. Missions should distribute
copies of all completed forms as well as this final report to-at a
minimum-the host nation, other INGOs participating in observation
of the election, and the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division.
C. Concluding Remarks on the ProposedAnnex

By addressing in detail the preceding eight elements of
international election observation, the proposed Annex offers what
the Declaration alone does not-a clear, unambiguous statement of
the rights, duties, and responsibilities of both international election
observers and host nations. The proposed Annex gives INGOs and
states alike the opportunity either to incorporate its provisions
directly into their codes of conduct and election laws or to use its
detailed stipulations as a guide for their own laws and regulations.
VII. CONCLUSION

International election observation is an efficient and increasingly
prevalent tool for guaranteeing free and fair elections. When election
observation missions succeed, all elements of election processes are
more likely to adhere to national law and satisfy international
democratic standards.
This Note has reviewed existing international election
observation standards, examined a selection of national election laws,
and proposed a detailed Annex to the leading source of international
election observation principles-the UN Declaration of Principles for
International Election Observation. The proposed Annex is wide in
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scope and rich in detail. It- addresses the objectives of observation,
the importance of respecting national sovereignty, the invitation and
accreditation of observers, the obligations of host nations requisite to
the acceptance of invitations to observe, the rights of and limits on
election observers, and those observers' duty to report their findings.
Rather than offering generalized principles that election observers
should follow, the proposed Annex enriches existing standards of
international election observation and offers specific provisions that
nations and INGOs can adopt outright or use as a detailed guideline.
The proposed Annex promotes efficient and standardized
international election observation practices worldwide. It will not
only clarify the rights and obligations of observers but also provide
states with a set of easily adoptable standards. Never before has the
international community espoused a platform that moves its
members-as a whole-so much closer to a uniform scheme for
international election observation. The adoption of the proposed
Annex to the UN Declaration of Principles for International Election
Observation would do just that.
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Appendix A
Proposed Annex to the UN Declaration of Principles for
International Election Observation
I.

Objectives and Implications of International Election Observation
A.
Theoretical Underpinnings of International Election
Observation
1.
The Right to Vote: The right of all citizens
to vote is a basic human right guaranteed by
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights.
2.
Participation in Public Affairs: All citizens
enjoy a basic human right to participate in the
public affairs of his country, which manifests
itself in the right to vote.

3.

B.

Free and Fair Elections: Elections are the

fundamental decision-making process in all
democracies
and represent
any state's
foremost expression of national sovereignty.
For this reason, free and fair elections serve
the important goal of demonstrating sovereign
authority and legitimacy.
Concrete
Objectives
of International
Election
Observation
1.
Properly executed international election
observation missions have the ability toa.
help
host
countries
administer
credible elections;
b.
usher
"transitional
democracies"
through their first foray into the
electoral process; and
c.
establish lasting electoral programs in
host countries that are conducive to
continued free and fair elections.
2.
International election observation missions'
external legitimization of national elections is
critical to ensuring the broad acceptance of
the outcome of those elections.

811

812

VANDERBIL TOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

C.

[VOL. 43:763

Broader Implications of International Election
Observation
1.
The principles protected by international
election observation-namely, sovereignty and
democracy-are relevant not only to host
nations but also to democratic governments
worldwide.
2.
Democratic governments have an interest in
healthy democracies throughout the world
because theya.
can help resolve conflicts without
violence; and
b.
contribute to the maintenance of
global peace and promotion of
egalitarian principles.

II. Respecting National Sovereignty
A.
Notwithstanding the objectives and implications of
international election observation established in
Article I of this Annex, observers may take absolutely
no action that threatens the national sovereignty of a
host nation by interfering in decision-making
processes that should be left to the discretion of that
nation.
B.
In furtherance of this regulation, observers must1.
remain politically neutral throughout the
observation mission;
2.
monitor elections passively and record their
observations rather than intervening.
C.
The prohibitions of certain activities in this Article
shall not be construed to exclude other prohibitions of
actions that may threaten national sovereignty
enumerated in the following provisions of this Annex.
III. Invitation of International Election Observers
A.
International election observation missions and
individual election observers must receive an
invitation to observe from the host nation before
entering that nation.
B.
The purposes of invitations include but are not limited
to1.
protecting the sovereignty of the host nation;
2.
ensuring that observation missions may have
adequate time to undertake all necessary
preparations before beginning their work; and
3.
establishing the extent of an observation
mission's or an individual observer's mandate
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and binding the host nation to opening the
entire electoral process to observers.
Content of Invitations
1.
Invitation should make clear that observers
will be entitled to monitor all the steps of the
entire electoral process, including but not
limited tothe creation of election authorities;
a.
voter registration;
b.
the nomination of candidates;
c.
d.
campaigning;
voting;
e.
the counting of votes; and
f.
the handling of objections.
g.
2.
The enumerations in this section shall not be
construed to exclude other steps that make up
part of a nation's electoral process.
Invitations may take various forms, including but not
limited to1.
permanent provisions of international law
permitting observers to participate in all (or
certain specified) elections;
2.
provisions of regional agreements between
nations permitting observers from states
parties to the agreement to participate in the
observation of elections in any of the other
states parties;
case-by-case invitations extended by the host
3.
nation to international election observation
organizations or individual observers;
4.
any other form of invitation that makes
absolutely clear that the host nation consents
to international election observation missions.
Host nations should extend invitations at a
reasonable time prior to election day. As a general
rule, the amount of time before the election that host
nations should allow when extending invitations
should1.
be based on the situation on the ground and
the presumed difficulty of preparing an
election observation mission;
2.
never be shorter than one month.

IV. Obligations and Duties of Host Nations Requisite to the
Acceptance of an Invitation
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Host nations have an obligation to assure
international election observation organizations
thatthe election process will be carried out in
1.
peaceful circumstances;
the national election law is conducive to the
2.
free and fair elections and meets widely
accepted democratic standards;
the observation organizations may choose
3.
their own observers without discrimination or
preferences by the host nation;
observers will have full access to the entire
4.
electoral process and all election officials in
the observation area;
observers may engage in open and ongoing
5.
officials
with
national
communication
specifically designated as election liaisons;
observation organizations shall be considered
6.
to be under the patronage of the host nation
while conducting its observation activities;
they will provide all vital services including
7.
but not limited tomeans of transportation;
a.
and
facilities
communication
b.
equipment;
other equipment necessary to fulfill
c.
observation duties;
d.
police protection; and
emergency medical care.
e.
International election observation organizations
should conduct preliminary research independently to
determine that any guarantees made by the host
nation are actually true. If organizations have any
reason to believe that the host nations will be
incapable of meeting these preconditions, they reserve
the right to decline to conduct election observation in
that host nation.

V. Accreditation of International Election Observers
Any individual participating in international election
A.
observation must receive accreditation from the
election commission of the host nation before
commencing any procedures related to election
observation.
B.
Accreditation satisfies two primary purposes-
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Ensuring that sanctioned observers are easily
identifiable
and able to move freely
throughout the observation area; and
2.
Preventing fraudulent observation attempts.
Accreditation procedures may be divided into two
primary categories1.
Qualifications for obtaining observer status;
and
2.
Administrative measures.
Qualifications for obtaining observer status include
but are not limited to1.
a minimum age requirement that matches the
minimum voting age in the host nation;
2.
the lack of political affiliations with any
groups or individuals within the host nation;
3.
the lack of financial associations with any
political entities within the host nation;
4.
the lack of familial relationships with any
political entities within the host nation; and
5.
any other situation that may lend itself to
bias.
All invited observers must complete an application to
obtain accreditation that requires them to provide1.
their full name;
2.
their nationality;
3.
their home address;
4.
their place of residence within the host nation;
5.
a copy of valid government identification (such
as a passport or driver's license);
6.
two photographs; and
7.
an indication of whether they are working on
behalf of a political party, specific candidate,
or INGO.
Applicants should submit applications to the host
nation's election commissions according to the
following timeline1.
It is recommended that applicants file all
necessary paperwork at least 10 days before
election day;
2.
If applicants fail to file paperwork according
to the deadline established in subsection (1) of
this section, they may still apply for
accreditation under a provisional procedure.
a.
Under the provisional procedure,
applicants
provide
the
same
information as normal applicants as
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well as an explanation for the delay in
their submission.
Host nations are encouraged to
b.
expedite the approval process so that
provisional applicants may begin
observation as soon as possible.
Provisional applications may be filed
c.
at any time after the initial
recommended deadline and until polls
open on election day.
Host nations should face no legal
d.
obligation to approve provisional
applications, but they should not fail
to approve such applications simply
because of the time at which the
applications were submitted.
Applicants denied accreditation may appeal the denial
first to the national election commission and then, if
denied again, to the federal trial court of the host
nation. In all cases, host nations reserve the right to
determine the details of procedures within their
judicial system.
Approved applicants shall receive an identification
card1.
printed in the language of the host nation and
in the observer's native language;
2.
including the observer's name, nationality,
and local address;
indicating whether the observer represents
3.
any candidate, party, or INGO;
noting where the observer may conduct his
4.
work;
photograph
observer's
the
displaying
5.
prominently;
6.
printed on a material difficult to forge.
Host nations may, according to their discretion,
require that observers carry a second form of personal
identification such as a passport of driver's license.
Host nations may revoke an observer's accreditation if
that observer is found to have violated national law,
international legal norms, or regulations established
with regard to that observer's individual mandate.
Revocation of accreditation shall not be construed to
strip the host nation of the right to prosecute an
observer who has committed legal violations.
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VI. An Observer's Mandate: Rights and Reach of International
Election Observers
A.
Temporal Mandate
1.
Accredited observers enjoy the right to
observe everything related to the electoral
process and may ask questions related to their
mission.
2.
Accredited observers shall have the right to
observe all parts of the electoral process,
lasting from the day that national authorities
announce an election through the day the
final administrative actions related to that
election are complete.
B.
The rights of observers during election observation
may be broken down into three, shorter temporal
periods: pre-election day, election day, and postelection day.
During the pre-election day period, observers shall
C.
have the right to observe voter registration,
nomination of candidates, campaigning, and other
pre-election preparations.
1.
As to voter registration, observers shall
ensure thatregistration
make
a.
host nations
facilities or methods available in all
parts of the country at convenient
times; and
b.
specific classes of people are not
prevented from registering to vote.
2.
As to the nomination of candidates, observers
shall ensure thata.
all legally eligible individuals desiring
to run for office are able to do so;
b.
illegitimate limitations based on
immutable characteristics such as race
or gender are not placed upon
potential candidates; and
c.
the host nation makes information
about
the
nomination
process,
deadlines, and other important dates
readily available.
3.
As to campaigning, observers shall monitor
whethera.
the host nation affords all groups and
individuals equal freedom of assembly
and opinion;
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all candidates enjoy the same access to
venues and audiences;
c.
tactics meant to limit a candidate's
ability to campaign-such as fear and
intimidation-are prohibited.
4.
As to preparations for election day, observers
shall observe processes including but not
limited toa.
the creation of national, regional, and
local election authorities;
b.
the training of election personnel;
c.
the nomination and accreditation of
political agents;
d.
the identification of polling stations;
and
e.
the
distribution
of
necessary
equipment and election materialsincluding voting machines, ballot
boxes, paper ballots, and writing
utensils-to those polling stations.
Election Day Observation
1.
On election day, observers shall monitor
procedures including but not limited to-a.
the preparation of empty ballot boxes;
b.
the storage of early votes in
appropriate ballot boxes;
c.
the preparation of voter rolls;
d.
voter sign-in at the polling station;
e.
the conduct of poll workers throughout
election day;
f.
the counting of votes;
the tallying of unused ballots;
g.
h.
the preparation of any protocol or
other statements related to voting or
election results; and
i.
the transfer of those documents to the
national election commission.
2.
It should be noted that election observers have
the right to provide real-time constructive
criticism and advice to election workers who
appear to be improperly enforcing national
electoral laws and regulations.
Observers
may only offer judgments about the
implementation of national laws. Given the
importance of national sovereignty, observers
should not provide recommendations they feel
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proper but that are not mandated by existing
laws.
During the post-election day period, observers shall
have the right to monitor procedures including but
not limited to1.
the preparation of protocols related to voting
and election results that have not been
completed on election day; and
2.
any recounts or related procedures.

An Observer's Limits: Obligations of and Limits on
International Election Observers
A.
Observers are subject to all laws of the host nation
and may not claim immunity in any circumstances.
This obligation to follow national laws also demands
that observers cooperate with all national officials.
B.
Observers must remain strictly neutral and impartial
throughout the election process.
They may not
engage in any activities that could interfere with the
ultimate result of the election. Such activities include
but are not limited to1.
campaigning;
2.
voting;
3.
issuing ballots to voters;
4.
polling voters;
5.
helping voters vote (even if requested);
6.
influencing or lobbying voters;
7.
partaking in the official vote counting; and
responding to voters' questions about subjects
8.
unrelated to observation.
Observers may not obstruct the work of national
C.
election authorities by engaging in activities including
but not limited togenerally interfering with electoral officials;
1.
2.
using one's status as an observer for purposes
unrelated to observation;
3.
working with other individuals or groups
besides one's own observation mission.
D.
Electoral officials of the host nation reserve the right
to record the personal information of any observer
present at a polling station at any point during the
election observation period.

Reporting Duties of International Election Observers and
VIII.
Observation Missions
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Observers should view themselves as providers of
substantiated evaluations of the observed election
based on raw date and anecdotal evidence.
Observers should thus make available to the public
accurate and impartial reports that include not only
the evidentiary findings of their election observation
missions but also recommendations for improving
the electoral process.
Reporting can be divided into two manageable
periods: pre-election day reporting and election day
reporting.
1.
As to reports on pre-election day proceedings,
observers should include but not be limited
toreviews of national electoral laws
a.
undertaken to ensure thatthe franchise is universal;
i.
ii. all votes are counted only once;
iii. the ballot is secret;
iv. no person is improperly excluded
from voting based on immutable
characteristics such as race or
gender;
v. all political parties are eligible to
participate in the election; and
vi. all candidates are equally free to
campaign; and
reviews of the actual application of
b.
these laws undertaken to ensure
thatall eligible parties who wish to do
i.
so are able to field candidates;
ii. all candidates have equal ability
to run a campaign;
iii. there is a fair voter registration
process that does not improperly
discriminate; and
iv. there exists freedom of assembly
and campaigning.
2.
As to election day proceedings, observers
should include but not be limited tocontinuing reviews of all aspects of the
a.
election process laid out in subsection
(1) of this section;
reviews of the behavior of national
b.
election officials at polling stations
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including but not limited to whether
those officialsi.
improperly turn voters away at
the polls;
ii. destroy or inappropriately handle
ballots;
iii.
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any other way misuse their

power in an effort to affect the
outcome of the election.
International election observation missions should
provide their observers with a standardized reporting
form for all parts of the observation period that are
developed in
accordance
with the following
procedures1.
Missions should work together-to the extent
possible-to
formulate
a
standardized
reporting form so that host nations,
individuals, and other organizations reviewing
the findings from any particular election have
only one template to examine;
2.
The reporting forms should include both
specific "yes or no" questions that address the
subjects outlined in section (C) of this Article
as well as blank space for observers to provide
additional commentary as necessary.
International election observation missions shall then
compile the reports from all respective observers and
draft a formal report that reviews each scrutinized
aspect of the election.
Copies of the final report required in section (E) of
this Article shall be distributed-at minimum-to
the host nation, other international organizations
participating in observation of the election in
question, and the United Nations Electoral
Assistance Division.
Copies shall also be made
available to the public upon request.

